Market reactions to legal insider trading on Oslo stock exchange marketplaces by Bøe, Axel Kveim & Dahl, Thea Aurora
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, Fall 2020
Market Reactions to Legal Insider Trading on
Oslo Stock Exchange Marketplaces
Axel Kveim Bøe and Thea Aurora Dahl
Supervisor: Darya Yuferova
Master thesis, Economics and Business Administration
Major: Financial Economics
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are
responsible – through the approval of this thesis – for the theories and methods used, or




This thesis concludes our Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration
with a major in Finance at the Norwegian School of Economics.
We would like to express our appreciation to our supervisor, Darya Yuferova, for providing
us with thorough guidance and valuable feedback throughout the process of writing our
thesis. Further, we would like to thank our families for their unconditional support.
Norwegian School of Economics
Bergen, December 2020
Thea Aurora Dahl Axel Kveim Bøe
ii
Abstract
This paper investigates market reactions to legal insider trades on the Oslo Stock
Exchange and analyses whether being listed on the sub-marketplace Merkur Market
causes abnormal returns and turnover from insider transactions. Merkur Market is an
alternative marketplace with more lax regulations, which we speculate causes a higher
degree of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors. This
could further yield excess market reactions. There are several major findings from our
study. Firstly, insider purchases on the Oslo Stock Exchange cause both short-term
abnormal return and turnover. Secondly, reactions from insider sales are weaker than from
insider purchases. We argue that this may be due to insiders often selling for liquidation
or diversification purposes. Thirdly, we find that both abnormal return and abnormal
turnover from insider purchases are significantly higher for companies listed on Merkur
Market than for those listed on the main exchange (XOSL). Finally, we compare market
reactions from Merkur Market companies to a matched XOSL sample and find that being
listed on Merkur Market cause abnormal returns of 5.60 per cent and an increase in
turnover of 3.76 per cent for insider purchases.
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1 Introduction
Corporate insiders often possess superior information to outside investors and their trading
activity consequently provides useful guidance about the underlying value of the company.
Researchers have previously documented that the information content of insider trades
causes market reactions, and further that the reactions increase in line with information
asymmetry.1 However, does the sub-marketplace companies are listed on effect market
reactions from insider trades?
During the last few years there has been an emergence of alternative marketplaces aiming
to enable small-cap growth companies to access capital markets, with Merkur Market2
(MERK) being the equivalent on the Oslo Stock Exchange. MERK offers both less
regulatory requirements and a much less extensive listing process than the main exchange
(XOSL).3 Listings on MERK are increasing in popularity, with 47 companies listed in 2020
alone against five listings on XOSL (Slettedal, 2020). The marketplace is also increasing in
popularity amongst both institutional and retail investors. However, we hypothesise that
the lax regulations this marketplace imposes, has implications for information asymmetry
between the corporate insiders and outside investors.
Given the evidence of increased market reactions in information asymmetry, this thesis
investigates whether being listed on MERK has implications for market reactions from
insider trading. We find an effect of 5.60 per cent higher abnormal return and a 3.76 per
cent increase in abnormal turnover around insider trades from being listed on MERK. The
economically and statistically significant deviations in market reactions from insider trades
caused by choice of listing venue on the same stock exchange, implies that there exists
an internal imbalance of information content. The Oslo Stock Exchange has expressed
the importance of Merkur Market being perceived as an efficient marketplace with
sufficient transparency, to which we find contradicting evidence (Oslo Stock Exchange,
2015). These findings should therefore be of particular interest to policy researchers
and regulatory authorities concerned with market efficiency and the consequences of
1Aboody and Lev (2000) show that R&D intensive firms have greater price reactions. Hong et al.
(2000) provide evidence that momentum are larger for insiders in small firms and firms with low analyst
coverage.
2Merkur Market changed name in October 2020 to Oslo Euronext Growth. Throughout this thesis,
we will use the name Merkur Market (MERK).
3Comparable description of XOSL and MERK in Table 11 in the Appendix.
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information asymmetry.
This thesis offers three major contributions to previous literature. Firstly, to the best of
our knowledge there are no existing studies investigating the short-term market reactions
from insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Eckbo and Smith (1998) investigated
insider gains from portfolios mimicking Oslo Stock Exchange insiders’ activities and found
no evidence that insiders outperform the market. However, the regulations at the time
precluded analysis of the short-term market reactions and therefore gives no implications as
to the short-term effect of insider trades. For the aggregated sample, we find a cumulative
average abnormal return (CAAR) from insider purchases of 1.74 per cent around the event
date. This is higher than for both the US Stock Exchange with 0.59 per cent (Lakonishok
& Lee, 2001) and the UK Stock Exchange with 1.16 per cent (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). This
suggests that information content is higher for insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Secondly, there is no existing literature that examines market reactions from insider
trades and differentiate for sub-marketplaces on the same stock exchange. However, there
are other studies that investigate the impact of information asymmetry. For example,
Aboody and Lev (2000) who find a 0.20 per cent difference in abnormal returns for
high versus low R&D firms ex-post insider trades and Chari et al. (1988) who finds that
price reactions for small firms are 8.27 per cent higher than for large firms on the event
date of earnings announcements. This compared to our findings of 5.60 per cent higher
abnormal returns from insider trades as a result of being listed on MERK. Further, Chae
(2005) finds information asymmetry to be positively correlated with abnormal turnover
from information-generating events. Our results are in line with this finding, providing
evidence of abnormal turnover increasing by 3.76 per cent if a company is listed on
MERK rather than XOSL. Moreover, the methodology we use exceeds the traditional
event study approach preformed by the former by using a cross-sectional regression model
with a matched sample. This allows us to investigate any causal effects, whilst the former
interpret the differences in coefficients.
Lastly, our findings are derived from an unparalleled dataset of insider transactions. The
Oslo Stock Exchange announce insider trades as string text, and there is no available
structured data to conduct quantitative analysis of the nature in this thesis. All insider
trades from the sample period have been manually extracted, inspected and further
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categorised, leaving a unique data sample that is also applicable for further analysis on
the topic.
Our analysis uses the event study methodology to extract cumulative average abnormal
returns (CAAR) and cumulative average abnormal turnover (CAAV) for buy and sell
activity across transaction value and marketplace categories.4 Further, we preform a
comparative analysis using a cross-sectional regression model with cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) and cumulative abnormal turnover (CAV) from the event study, as
dependent variables.5 First, we perform an analysis for the full sample, before we
construct a comparable sample from XOSL using propensity score matching. The aim is
to fulfill the requirements for causal inference between the Oslo Stock Exchange listing
venue and market reactions to insider trades. The examined transactions are legal insider
trades that have been reported to the Oslo Stock Exchange between 01.01.2017 and
28.02.2020 by insiders in companies exclusively listed on XOSL or MERK. This thesis only
examines legal and publicly available insider trades. Thus, the findings give no indication
to the effects of illegal insider trades, such as third-party trading, and insider trading
refers only to legal insider trading in the further.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. First, in Section 2, we perform
a review of the theoretical framework and related literature on insider trading and
asymmetric information, as well as a description of current regulations on insider trading.
A description of the collection and treatment of the data, along with an explanation of the
matching process is presented in Section 3. Furthermore, Section 4 introduces the event
study methodology and the regression models used in the analysis, before our results are
presented and discussed in Section 5. The limitations of the study are discussed in Section
6. Lastly, our findings are concluded in Section 7, where we also provide limitations and
guidance for further research on the topic.
4CAAR is calculated using arithmetic returns and CAAV is calculated using logarithmic turnover.
Overlapping events are aggregated into equally weighted portfolios.
5CAR is based on logarithmic abnormal returns with  s estimated from the market model with
event window [-110, 20]. CAV is measured as logarithmic abnormal turnover (Daily volume/mCap). A
transaction value cap of NOK (Norwegian krone) 125,000 apply for both models.
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2 Literature review
This section defines insider trading and explains current regulations, before we address
related theoretical and empirical literature on legal insider trading and information
asymmetry. Theory on market efficiency and asymmetric information is presented before
reviewing empirical evidence on insider gains, market reactions to insider trading and the
implications of asymmetric information.
2.1 Insider trading and Oslo Stock Exchange
regulations
Insider trading has been a widely debated topic in finance literature and involves the
trading of public financial instruments by individuals who are closely related to the firm
in question. Individuals classified as insiders include large shareholders, chief executive
officers, top management and members of the Board of Directors. Such individuals will at
times possess information that is expected to affect future cash-flows and ultimately the
stock price of the company. Corporate insiders could exploit this information by buying
stocks prior to an abnormal price increase, or by selling stocks before a price decline.
Moreover, the activity of insiders could portray information that is not yet reflected in
the current market price, which again could yield market reactions.
Whether insider trading should be subject to regulation is disputed. Critiques argue that
insider trading can be considered an adequate entrepreneurial compensation for innovation
of ideas that are not easily linked to profit (Manne, 1967). Furthermore, insider trading
can increase market efficiency by conveying information to other market participants and
thereby moving the market price closer to the fundamental value of the firm (Manne,
1992). For example, Leland (1992) found that stock prices are generally higher and convey
more information when insiders trade actively. However, many argue that information
asymmetry, where market participants have deviating material information concerning
the underlying value of a security provides insiders with an unethical advantage, which
can discourage outsider market activity (Ausubel, 1990). To control for the latter, the
vast majority of countries with an active stock exchange have implemented laws and
regulatory systems for insider trading activities in order to prevent insider gains at the
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expense of uninformed market participants (Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002). In Norway,
insider trading is legal and encouraged, with an exemption of trading on information that
is likely to have a significant effect on the stock price of a company (Oslo Stock Exchange,
2020a). Furthermore, all primary insiders are obligated to report their trades to the Oslo
Stock Exchange in accordance with the requirements set by the Norwegian Securities
Trading Act. The deadline to notify an insider trade is no later than the start of trading
the following day and the notified trades shall, according to the Securities Trading Act, be
publicly disclosed directly, with certain exemptions (The Financial Supervisory Authority
of Norway , 2019). The implication from this is that the lag from when an insider trade is
executed until it is reported shall in theory be no longer than one day.
2.2 Market efficiency
The most central function of capital markets is allocation of financial assets, where market
prices ideally should work as informed indicators for allocation of resources (Fama, 1998).
In an efficient market, all available information is fully reflected in the price of financial
assets. This indicates that it would not be possible for investors to profit from investment
strategies. If insider trades cause reactions in stock prices, it would suggest that the
transactions provide information that is not yet reflected in the market.
The infamous efficient market hypothesis was introduced by Fama in 1970 and claims
that the price of a security reflects all available information about the asset. As new
information emerges, investors revise their expectations and the price of the security will
adjust thereafter. Overvaluation and undervaluation will be noncurrent as all market
participants possess the same information. The model does not dismiss anomalies, but
mispricing is said to be eliminated as overreactions and underreactions are equally common.
According to the theory, outperforming the market is therefore unachievable.
The null hypothesis of the efficient market model is that all available information is
at all times fully reflected in the market price. Fama (1970) recognises that this is an
extreme hypothesis and introduces three forms of market efficiency to more easily test
the degree of information at which the hypothesis does not hold. Weak form market
efficiency claims that the only information reflected in security prices is historical data on
the price movements or returns of a security. Most empirical evidence finds that markets
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are efficient in weak form, supporting the random walk model. Semi-strong market
efficiency suggests that all obvious publicly available information is reflected in security
prices. Semi-strong market tests investigate how prices adjust to events that generate
price-sensitive information, typically public announcements. Strong form market efficiency
assumes that all information is fully reflected in the price. Moreover, the requirements for
both weak form and semi-strong form hold, and it is not possible to profit if an individual
possesses monopolistic information.
Market reactions to insider trading tests strong form market efficiency. If insider
transactions generate abnormal returns or abnormal trading volume, it would be
inconsistent with the theory on efficient capital markets. The analysis in this thesis
is restricted to strong form market efficiency. A semi-strong test using insider trades
would test whether outsiders would be able to profit from the information of insider trades
by constructing portfolios that mimic the behaviour of insiders. However, for the purpose
of our analysis we only test strong-form market efficiency by concentrating on short-term
market implications from insider trades.
2.3 Information asymmetry
If the efficient market hypothesis does not hold for insider trades, it suggests that corporate
insiders are in possession of superior information that ultimately affects the value of the
firm. It is reasonable to assume that asymmetric information is present for insiders,
as management has continuous insight into productivity and operations, while outside
investors only possess highly aggregated information provided at specific points in time.
Asymmetric information conceptualises the information imbalance between two parties in
a transaction and is thereby highly relevant when investigating insider gains.
George et al. (1970) first introduced the concept of information asymmetry in their paper
The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. They focus
on the concept of Adverse Selection, which is the most relevant form of information
asymmetry to insider trading. Adverse selection is the phenomenon of one party purposely
withholding information before reaching an agreement, to maximise own gains. This is
directly applicable to insider trading as insiders at times will possess information that
is crucial to the future performance of the firm, and can choose to act on it. Insiders
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can use the information to their advantage through buying company stock in advance
of positive announcements, or by selling stock in advance of announcements that are
predicted to devalue the stock price. The theory suggests that a higher level of information
asymmetry leads to an increased probability of mispricing. Applying this to the scenario
of insider trading would suggest that market reactions will be larger for firms with a high
degree of information asymmetry. On the back of this, we hypothesise that due to the
characteristics of MERK as a marketplace, market reactions from information-generating
events will be stronger.
2.4 Insider trading and profitability
There are several papers that examine the profitability of legal insider trading, where most
research concludes that insiders tend to outperform the market. Lorie and Niederhoffer
(1968) were pioneers in presenting evidence on the profitability of insiders by examining
insider trading activity from 105 New York Stock Exchange companies. Their research
concludes that when insiders excessively purchase a security, the security is expected to
outperform the market for six months following the transaction. Further early research
on the topic includes that of Jaffe (1974) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988) who found that
corporate insiders achieve statistically significant abnormal returns post trading. Finnerty
(1976) also found evidence that insiders are able to identify and profit from private material
information, discarding the strong-form market efficiency hypothesis. Moreover, there
seems to be strong evidence of insider gains where insider portfolios outperform the market
with reported abnormal returns ranging from 3 per cent to 30 per cent (Lin & Howe, 1990;
Seyhun, 1998; Jeng et al., 2003; Pratt & DeVere, 1970).
On the other hand, the conclusions on the profitability of mimicking portfolios are
more ambiguous. Literature on this topic ultimately tests the semi-strong market
efficiency hypothesis by examining whether outsiders can profit from the publicly available
information from reported insider trades. Using the market model, Rozeff and Zaman
(1988) conclude that outsiders can earn annual abnormal returns of 6 per cent through
acting on publicly available information concerning insider trades. Whilst these results
are in violation of the semi-strong market efficiency hypothesis, both Rozeff and Zaman
(1988) and Jaffe (1974) found that when assuming a transaction cost of 2 per cent,
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the abnormal returns from mimicking insiders’ activities disappear or turn negative.
Furthermore, Seyhun (1986) provides evidence that the semi-strong market efficiency
holds by concluding that the realisable return to outsiders is non-positive despite finding
that insiders predict abnormal future share prices.
The research discussed above is conducted on foreign exchanges. Previous literature on
insider trading on Oslo Stock Exchange is limited, with the exception of a study by Eckbo
and Smith (1998). They examined the performance of insider portfolios, tracking the
movements of insiders’ buy and sell activity. The methodology they use is a conditional
portfolio benchmark approach that constructs and aggregates replicating portfolios of
insiders’ actual trading behaviour and compare them to the performance of active mutual
funds. The study rejects the hypothesis that insiders achieve positive abnormal returns,
with statistically insignificant results and, in some cases, negative abnormal returns.
However, in the period upon which the data sample is based, the requirement for reporting
of insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange was restricted to quarterly submission of
insider activity. Thus, the study provides no evidence on short-term market reactions to
insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
2.5 Insider trading and market reactions
One drawback of the earliest research on insider trading is that it mostly focuses on
long-term abnormal returns and whether insiders are able to predict future security
prices and thereby outperform the market. Although it gives a good indication on the
information content of the trades, it does not contribute towards explaining immediate
market reactions. This can, foremost, be explained by historic regulations regarding
reporting of insider trades allowing for longer delays in reporting. In the studies mentioned
above, the lag from a trade is executed until it is reported is generally large and the
market reactions from the trade is thereby difficult to isolate.
More recent studies that examine the short-term price implications of insider trading
include Fidrmuc et al. (2006), who investigated the UK stock market. For insider purchases,
the CAAR for their sample was 1.65 per cent, whilst sales show a coefficient of negative
0.49 per cent. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also examined short-term price reactions to legal
insider trades, but for the US Stock Exchange. However, they only found marginal short-
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term abnormal returns of 0.59 per cent, but highlight that the lag from slow reporting
likely has implications. Aktas et al. (2008) also examined the US stock market and
conclude that financial markets have a weak but significant response to insider purchases
with a 0.52 per cent CAAR for insider purchases, whilst insider sales gave an unexpected
positive sign. Furthermore, Aussenegg and Ranzi (2008) conducted a multi-country study
on the short-term price impact of insider trading in continental Europe. This study also
finds that there are both significant negative returns following insider sales and positive
returns following insider purchases. Mutual for these studies is that the magnitude of
abnormal returns from insider purchases tend to be much larger than for insider sales,
with absolute CAARs for purchase transactions being at least twice as large. Furthermore,
both Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide evidence that abnormal
returns tend to be greater for larger transactions.
Overall, previous literature is somewhat ambiguous as to whether insiders are able to
predict future share prices and achieve abnormal returns. However, a majority conclude
that insiders obtain abnormal returns on their trades compared to the market, indicating
that the trades contain information that is not yet reflected in the market. In an efficient
market, this should yield market reactions. Studies investigating short-term price reactions
present ambiguous results on the implications of insiders sales. However, they all find
significant positive abnormal returns to insider purchases, although of different magnitude.
Furthermore, although there is evidence that Oslo Stock Exchange insiders fail to obtain
long-term abnormal returns, short-term market reactions from insider trades on the Oslo
Stock Exchange are yet to be investigated.
2.6 Insider trading and volume
In comparison with previous literature examining properties of returns to measure abnormal
performance, there is significantly less research investigating the distribution of trading
volume. Trading volume also plays a crucial part in financial markets and contributes
towards uncovering investors’ response to information. Furthermore, abnormal volume
can capture deviations in market reactions for different investors that are eased out in
daily returns. Chae (2005) investigated abnormal trading volume post both scheduled
and unscheduled information-generating events, including earning announcements, target
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and merger announcements and Moody’s ratings. He found an increase from daily trading
volume ranging from 5.40 to 98.63 per cent on the announcement date.
Further, some researchers have investigated abnormal trading volume in presence of
asymmetric information. Chae (2005) also discusses this by looking at abnormal volume
prior to information-generating events to explain how investors respond to asymmetric
information. He found that before scheduled announcements, trading volume decreased
by approximately 15 per cent whilst trading volume increased prior to unscheduled
announcements. This suggests that trading volume increase in information asymmetry.
Kyle (1985) investigates the liquidity characteristics during insider trading by using a
dynamic model with sequential auctions. He finds that abnormal trading volume is higher
prior to information-generating events with a higher degree of information asymmetry. In
contrast, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) study interday
variation in volume and find that trading volume can actually decrease in the presence of
information asymmetry.
To our knowledge, no existing literature explores the implications of insider trading
on abnormal volume. However, on the back of literature examining other information
generating events, it seems reasonable to assume that insider trades could lead to abnormal
trading volumes following a reported insider trade. Furthermore, it is interesting to
investigate whether abnormal trading volumes are higher on MERK, assuming that
market participators are more information sensitive to stocks listed on this exchange. It
is therefore in our interest to analyse whether we observe any abnormal trading volumes
in connection with insider trades and whether they deviate across Oslo Stock Exchange
marketplaces.
2.7 Insider trading and information asymmetry
In this thesis, we speculate that information asymmetry is greater on Merkur Market,
which potentially can yield abnormal market reactions. Although there is no previous
literature investigating deviations in market reactions across marketplaces, there is some
research examining the effect of information asymmetry using different proxies. A selection
of such literature will be reviewed in the following part.
It is reasonable to assume that for insiders to be able to gain from legal trades there
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must be a form of asymmetric information that insiders are in a position to exploit.
With this in mind, increased information asymmetry should likely be correlated with
higher insider gains. Overall, findings from related literature seem to support this logic.
Aboody and Lev (2000) research insider gains when treating R&D activities as a source
of asymmetric information. They find that abnormal returns are significantly higher for
R&D-intensive companies, with a monthly mean raw return of 5.49 per cent for firms
with R&D against 4.47 per cent for firms without R&D. The study also finds evidence
that investors’ reactions are stronger to insider trading announcements for R&D-intensive
firms, which suggests that there is a higher degree of information asymmetry in these
firms and that inside information is not reflected in advance of the trade.
Hong et al. (2000) hypothesise that there should be greater momentum in securities where
information travels more slowly and use firm size and analyst coverage to test this. When
looking at size they find that, with the exception of firms with market capitalisation below
$7 million, small firms have significantly higher momentum profits with 1.43 per cent
monthly raw returns for small companies, against zero for the largest firms. The findings
are similar for analyst coverage, where there is evidence of more momentum in the low
coverage stocks with a monthly difference of 0.42 per cent. These findings are further
supported by Chari et al. (1988) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995).
Considering the evidence that higher levels of information asymmetry lead to increased
insider gains, it is possible that market reactions are higher on Merkur Market.
2.8 Insider trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange
In sum, corporate insiders occasionally possess information that is material to the value
of the firm. Seeing that these individuals likely have a superior understanding of the
underlying value of firm assets, it is natural to hypothesise that their market activities
contain some information about the direction of the price of a security. As outlined in
the literature review above, there is plentiful evidence indicating that insiders achieve
abnormal returns from their trading activities. This suggests that the information content
in reported insider trades can be material for the future price of a security, which should
cause short-term market reactions according to the market efficiency theory. Evidently,
there is also previous literature that finds such adjustments in the form of short-term
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abnormal returns post insider trades. It is reasonable to assume that also market reactions
in the form of abnormal trading volumes might be observed around insider trades, although
not investigated specifically. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS I: Insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange cause short-term market
reactions.6
Furthermore, previous research shows that large insider transactions lead to higher
abnormal returns and that price adjustment is larger for insider purchases than for insider
sales. On the back of this, it is in our interest to investigate whether this holds for the
Oslo Stock Exchange through hypothesis II and III:
HYPOTHESIS II: Market reactions to insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange are
stronger following large transactions.
HYPOTHESIS III: Absolute market reactions to insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange
are higher for purchase transactions than for sales transactions.
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of being listed on MERK on
market reactions to legal insider trades. The degree of information asymmetry is proven
to affect market reactions, both in the sense of insider gains and trading volume. The
consensus from previous literature is that a higher degree of information asymmetry
results in increased market reactions to information-generating announcements. Given
that Merkur Market aims to enable small, high-growth companies, we believe that market
reactions will be stronger due to the characteristics of the marketplace. Furthermore, we
wish to investigate whether part of the potential stronger market reactions are actually
caused by being listed on Merkur Market, seeing that regulations are more lax. With this
in mind, we lastly hypothesise the following:
HYPOTHESIS IV: Market reactions to insider trades are stronger on MERK than on
XOSL.
HYPOTHESIS V: Being listed on MERK leads to stronger market reactions from insider
trades than being listed on XOSL.
6Oslo Stock Exchange here comprises the whole sample consisting of both XOSL and MERK. By
market reactions we mean abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume.
13
3 Data
In this chapter, we present our data sources and the assumptions made in the data
cleansing process, before we elaborate on the construction of our data sample. First, we
give an overview of the collection of data on insider trades before the data on stock prices
and other company variables are explained. We then present summary statistics of our
data sample. Lastly, we present the Propensity Score Matching methodology and how we
have conducted the matching applied in our cross-sectional regression analysis.
3.1 Insider trading data
The insider trades are collected from NewsWeb raw data provided by the Oslo Stock
Exchange. The raw data consists of string text from which all variables have been extracted
manually. The original dataset consists of 4,396 “mandatory notifications of trade primary
insiders” from the period 01.01.2017 to 28.02.2020. There are two main arguments for
choosing this time interval. Firstly, we have excluded 2016, as the first year of trading on
Merkur Market is characterised by a low number of insider trades and small transaction
volumes. Secondly, we have not included any insider trades occurring after February 2020,
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.7
The notifications contain date and time of announcement and transaction, the exchange
where each company is listed at the time of transaction, issuer sign (Oslo Stock Exchange
ticker), transaction price, transaction volume, whether the transaction was a sale or
purchase, currency, insider name and position and insider holding post transaction.
Furthermore, ISIN codes are added for matching purposes. The dataset contains insider
trades executed in securities listed on XOSL, XOAS (Oslo Axess) and MERK. The
number of companies represented in the raw data amounts to 258. We exclude all insider
trades from companies listed on XOAS, as the focus of the thesis is XOSL and MERK.
Companies delisted after or during the period analysed are included in the dataset.
All insider trades with a transaction value below NOK 125,000 (Norwegian Krone) are
excluded, as transactions of low value give a weaker insider trading signal according
to Lakonishok and Lee (2001). We deem this amount to be adequately large to avoid
7The Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) experienced an overall decrease of 14.8 per
cent through March 2020 despite a 16.8 per cent recovery the last two weeks of the month (Aase, 2020).
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transactions without information content, while still allowing for a sufficient number of
Merkur Market transactions. Furthermore, from manual inspection of the trades, we
discovered that the aforementioned requirement from the Norwegian Financial Supervisory
Authority of reporting insider trades no later than before market opening the next trading
day is violated in several instances in our dataset. Events reported as late as 120 days
after the trade occur in our raw data. As the main event window applied in our analysis
starts two days prior to an event8, we remove all events notified more than two days after
their transaction date. Furthermore, extreme outliers in terms of transaction values have
been removed.
All insider trades in shares or options from employee share purchasing programmes,
executive remuneration, private placements, seasoned offerings, gifts, or company internal
transactions have been excluded from our dataset, as we are interested in analysing the
effect of non-anticipated and information-generating insider trades. Lastly, all duplicate
notifications and trades conducted on exchanges apart from the Oslo Stock Exchange in
currencies other than NOK have been removed.
3.2 Stock price data
Company data has been collected from Refinitiv Eikon. The dataset consists of daily
observations of the closing price adjusted for dividends and stock splits, market value
(mCap), volume traded, outstanding shares (free float) and Book-to-Market ratio in the
period 30.06.2016 to 01.04.2020. All companies listed on XOSL and MERK in the period
are included in the dataset. The applied time frame allows us to calculate normal returns
for insider trades occurring early in 2017 and late February 2020. According to MacKinlay
(1997), the use of daily observations is preferred when there is no uncertainty regarding the
event date. The process of cleaning and structuring the data uncovered a few occurrences
of the closing price data not being adjusted for stock splits for very short intervals. Closing
price in these incidents has been interpolated using closing price prior to the split. Lastly,
our company data does not include days where OSE is closed for trading. Consequently,
we have adjusted the notification delay data for this, preventing these days to drive up
the mean of this variable.
8Further explained in Section 4.
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According to MacKinlay (1997), calculation of normal returns in an event study should be
conducted using a broad-based stock index. Consequently, we have chosen to utilise the
Oslo Stock Exchange All-share Index (OSEAX) for this purpose. This index consists of all
shares listed on XOSL, and the daily number of outstanding shares of its constituents is
applied in this value-weighted index. The index is further adjusted for dividend payments
and other corporate actions (Oslo Stock Exchange, 2020c).
In order to categorise the companies by sector, we have used the Oslo Stock Exchange
sector classification as a basis and made some generalising adjustments. Due to the
limited size of our event dataset, we found it necessary to merge some sectors into more
general categories, allowing a greater number of observations per sector. The 12 sector
classifications provided by the Oslo Stock Exchange has been merged into six new sectors.
Table 1 illustrates the new sector classifications.
Table 1: Merged industries
The table illustrates the merged industries based on the Oslo Stock Exchange sector classifications.
The 12 sector classifications provided by Oslo Stock Exchange has been merged into 6 new industries.
Finance Energy Industrials Consumer Goods Healthcare Technology
Finance Energy Industrials Consumer Discretionary Healthcare Information Technology
Real Estate Utilities Materials Consumer Staples Communication Services
Equity Certificates
3.3 Descriptive data
The final dataset applied in our analysis consists of 1,305 insider trades, with a total
of 1,104 stock purchase transactions and 201 sales. Table 2 gives an overview of the
relationship between transactions on XOSL and MERK. Descriptive statistics for the full
dataset across sell/purchase activity, sell/purchase aggregated for XOSL and MERK and
correlation matrices can be found in Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15 in the Appendix. From
Table 2, we can clearly see that the mean and median transaction values are both higher
for sales transactions on XOSL, compared to purchases on the same exchange. When
collecting our data, we observed a substantial amount of sales transactions being triggered
by an insider leaving the company, thereby selling a large fraction, if not all, of their
equity in the firm. Hence, this relationship is economically intuitive. For MERK, the
sales transactions do show a higher median value compared to to insider purchases, but
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this relationship turns when examining the mean transaction values. The high mean
transaction value on Merkur Market purchases could be explained by that even though
we have removed transactions with extreme monetary value, there remains some large
transactions in the dataset, driving the mean upward to some extent.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by exchange and
transaction type
The table illustrates the mean, median, standard deviation, min and max values of variables
market capitalisation (in mNOK), daily traded volume (in thousands), daily turnover, book-market-
ratio, transaction value (in tNOK) and notification delay (amount of days from transaction to
notification on NewsWeb), respectively, for purchase and sales transactions on MERK and XOSL.
Mean Median SD Min Max
MERK Purchase (N = 40)
mCap 1,648 385 2734 44 9,979
VOL 157.82 23.50 272.68 0.00 1009.30
Turnover 0.00284 0.00061 0.00445 0.00000 0.01798
Book-Market 0.527 0.322 0.533 0.028 2.564
Transaction value 5,972 567 12,327 137 51,000
Delay 0.57 0.00 0.78 0.00 2.00
XOSL Purchase (N = 1064)
mCap 12,157 2,773 47,824 44 534,686
VOL 958.97 155.00 2,464.52 0.00 22,382.40
Turnover 0.00454 0.00172 0.01124 0.00000 0.17126
Book-Market 0.809 0.619 0.580 -0.455 4.000
Transaction value 4,379 510 25,511 125 675,000
Delay 0.22 0.00 0.43 0.00 2.00
MERK Sale (N = 6)
mCap 728 451 897 85 2499
VOL 114.52 56.20 188.08 0.00 492.40
Turnover 0.00290 0.00310 0.00283 0.00000 0.00608
Book-Market 0.357 0.280 0.240 0.061 0.758
Transaction value 2,091 2,063 1,001 929 3,675
Delay 0.67 1.00 0.52 0.00 1.00
XOSL Sale (N = 195)
mCap 31,727 2,945 119,475 65 711,802
VOL 983.64 233.70 2,346.08 0.00 22,382.40
Turnover 0.00613 0.00225 0.01348 0.00000 0.10096
Book-Market 0.502 0.377 0.525 -0.490 2.222
Transaction value 15,570 1,073 85,109 126 1,066,646
Delay 0.32 0.00 0.50 0.00 2.00
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Figure 1: Distribution of insider purchases
The figure illustrates all insider purchases registered in our dataset on XOSL and MERK
through the period 01.01.2017 – 28.02.2020 by month, size, industry and company position.
Bars marked "M" illustrate MERK-data, while bars marked "O" illustrate XOSL-data. Size
is defined as follows: low is transaction volume in the interval NOK 125,000 - NOK
500,000. Medium transaction interval is NOK 500,000 - NOK 2,000,000 and large transactions
are transactions above NOK 2,000,000. The sector classifications originates from Table 1.
Monthly transactions Transactions by size
Transactions by industry Transactions by company position
Figure 1 presents descriptive data of purchase transactions by month, monetary size,
industry of the stocks traded and company position of the inside trader. The chart
of monthly transactions includes data from 2017, 2018, 2019 and the first two months
of 2020. Despite low amount of insider purchases in January, the effect of including
the 2020 data is illustrated by the substantial amount of insider trades in February
compared to the remaining months. The figure showing transactions by size illustrate
the distribution of the transaction size in the sample. Low transaction volumes are
defined as transactions in the interval NOK 125,000 - NOK 500,000. The medium
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transaction interval is NOK 500,000 - NOK 2,000,000 and large transactions are
transactions above NOK 2,000,000. From Figure 1, the transactions are relatively
evenly distributed across the transaction size categories. For industries, there seems to
be a majority of transactions within Finance, where we experienced a large presence
of mid-sized transactions in equity certificates9 when registering the insider trades.
Furthermore, the graph chart illustrates the absence of transactions within the Industrials
classification for MERK-listed companies. The insider trades are mainly driven by
transactions by the Board of Directors. The numbers of transactions from primary
shareholders and employees outside management (Other) are marginal. Many of the
registered trades from employees outside management disappeared when setting the cap on
transaction size, as many of these were smaller trades. For primary shareholders, many hold
majority positions in the companies and are therefore categorised as majority shareholders.
3.4 Propensity score matching
In order to perform a more precise estimation of the effect announced insider trades has on
companies listed on MERK versus XOSL, we will match companies on MERK with similar
companies on XOSL using propensity score matching. The method was first introduced
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and is a widely used approach to estimate the causal
effect of a treatment in observational studies (Abadie & Imbens, 2016). In the following
part, we only include insider purchases due to the low amount of insider sales transactions
on MERK.
According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), a major concern in our empirical study,
caused by its design, is the inability to observe how the returns of companies listed on
MERK would react to mandatory notifications of insider trades, had the stocks been listed
on XOSL. As the treatment in our study is defined as being listed on MERK, and the
control group being XOSL-listed companies, we are unable to observe the counterfactual
outcome of the treated firms. The returns of the stocks in our study are likely to be
correlated with what marketplace each company is listed on, entailing a possible problem
of endogeneity caused by a selection bias of the treated and the control group. As we want
9Equity certificates are shares issued by savings banks listed on XOSL and MERK.
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to interpret our results causally, the firms need to be matched on a set of characteristics
in order to create a sample of similar treated and untreated stocks, according to Angrist
and Pischke (2009).
3.4.1 The PSM model
The propensity score is the conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment
given a vector of observed covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). To estimate the
propensity score of each event, we apply a probit model, as Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008)
argue that probit and logit models yield similar results in cases with binary treatment. In
the PSM model, the dependent variable is the binary variable for treatment (D), and the
firm characteristics we wish to match on between the two groups act as the independent
variables used in the model. The model applied is derived from Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008). The expression for the propensity score is expressed as follows:
p(x) = prob(D = 1|x) = E(D|x) (1)
We use the binary variable MERK as the treatment variable D. This variable equals one if
a company is listed on Merkur Marked and, thus, is "treated", and zero if listed on XOSL.
The independent variables applied in the PSM are chosen by their ability to identify stocks
listed on XOSL with similar characteristics as stocks listed on MERK. The intention is to
create pairs that would have had similar market reactions in the applied event window if
they were both listed on XOSL. The applied independent variables are explained below:
Turnover, calculated as shares traded over number of outstanding shares, is included as
higher trading volume can be an indicator of higher liquidity, which in turn could reduce
movement in share price due to high volume transactions.
Market Capitalisation could be linked to stock liquidity and price movement. As
illustrated in Table 2, there are great differences in mean and median market capitalisation
between MERK and XOSL. Thus, creating a matched sample with companies of more
similar market value will be necessary to compare the returns from events on the two
exchanges.
Book-to-Market (BM) ratio is included in the matching as it can be used as an indicator
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of whether a company is a growth stock (low BM) or a value stock (high BM). Rozeff
and Zaman (1998) found an overreaction in returns post announced insider trades in US
growth stocks compared to value stocks.
Industry classification is included in the matching as we expect companies within the
same sector to react similarly to announced insider trades. Furthermore, companies of
the same classification are affected by the same trends within their sector. MERK-listed
companies are matched only with XOSL-listed companies within the exact same sector
in order to remove the possibility of cross-industry matching. Lastly, Table 17 in the
Appendix advocate for exact matching, as we see a significant differences in mean CAR
and CAV for each industry.
In order to match the pairs of companies after the propensity score is calculated for
each individual event, we employ the Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching algorithm. This
algorithm pairs the firms which are closest to one another based on their estimated
propensity scores (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Furthermore, there are two options
when matching with this model: whether or not to perform matching with or without
replacement. If we allow MERK events to be matched against multiple XOSL events,
we allow for replacement. With great difference in propensity scores between the two
populations, not allowing for replacement could increase bias, as it might become difficult
to find a proper match, according to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). This is an especially
relevant challenge when there are few non-treated observations compared to treated.
As illustrated in Table 2, the sample of XOSL-events constitutes the majority of all
notifications of insider purchase transactions in our dataset. Thus, we choose to use NN
without replacement, as we believe the bias mentioned above is limited in our case.
3.4.2 Matching quality and model assumptions
There are three main underlying assumptions in the PSM model. The first is the conditional
independence assumption. This assumption implies that systematic differences in outcomes
between treated and control group individuals with the same values in covariates are
attributable to treatment (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). As the design of our model does
not allow us to observe any pre-treatment characteristics of the companies listed on Merkur
Market, we are unable to observe the effect of treatment compared to pre-treatment data.
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Thus, it is challenging to argue that this clearly strong assumption of random treatment
assignment is met. Still, for the rest of our analysis, we assume the condition to be valid.
A second assumption is the common support assumption, which states that there are both
untreated and treated observations for every value of x. In order to test this assumption,
we need to evaluate whether the ranges of propensity scores for the two populations overlap.
This can be done through a visual inspection of the density distribution of propensity
scores for the matched/unmatched control group and the treated group, according to
Lechner (2001). Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of propensity scores pre and post-
matching, with histograms on the first row and density plots on the second. As illustrated
in the figure, the pre-matching distributions (left-side charts) are differing to a great
extent. The majority of propensity scores in the untreated group (XOSL-listed firms) are
very low. Furthermore, the treated scores pre-matching are more evenly distributed, with
some observations of very high propensity score. In order to meet the common support
assumption, we follow Smith and Todd (2005) and trim the propensity score densities,
requiring that the densities exceed zero by a threshold amount of 2 per cent. The trimming
removes the observations marked "Treated: Off support" in the upper left chart in Figure
2, in line with Bryson et al. (2002) stating that individuals that fall outside the region
of common support have to be disregarded from the analysis. Thus, after matching, as
illustrated in the two right charts of Figure 2, we see that the propensity score distribution
and density plot between the treated and control group exhibit a relatively satisfactory
overlap. On the back of this, we conclude our visual inspection by stating that the common
support assumption is satisfied in our matched dataset.
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Figure 2: Distribution of propensity scores pre-
and post-match
The figure illustrates the distribution of propensity scores pre (left) and post (right) propensity
score matching. Propensity score densities are trimmed at a minimum 2 per cent threshold,
removing all observations off common support. This is illustrated in the upper left
figure. The upper row presents histograms, while the lower includes charts of density plots.
A third and final important assumption, named the "balancing condition", states that
one should observe the same x -characteristics, given the same propensity score (Caliendo
& Kopeinig, 2008). This condition is evaluated by comparing the similarity of treated
and non-treated observations after matching, based on the pre-treatment characteristics.
Again, missing pre-treatment characteristics for the treated group, this assumption is
hard to test. Nevertheless, Table 3 provides a clear overview of the difference between the
matching variables before and after matching. The table illustrates large deviations in
market capitalisation, Book-to-Market ratios and turnover pre-matching. Furthermore,
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the t-test comparing the mean value of the treated and control, unmatched and matched,
illustrates that the mean value of the Book-Market variable pre-matching is statistically
different between the two groups.
When we evaluate the post-matching data in Table 3, we see that the matching algorithm
has, to some extent, been able to balance the independent variables of the MERK-listed
and XOSL-listed companies. The observed characteristics are more similar post-matching;
none of the mean values for the two groups are statistically different. According to Caliendo
and Kopeinig (2008), the bias between the treated and control groups post-matching
should not exceed 5 per cent in order to be seen as sufficient. Thus, the bias in the
matched sample variables are not sufficient, except for market capitalisation.
As MERK-listed companies are matched only with XOSL-listed companies within the
exact same sector in order to remove the possibility of cross-industry matching, the
industry classification matching is not illustrated in Table 3 as the mean values of this
dummy-matching is irrelevant, and the bias for all five matched sectors equals zero
post-matching.
If we do not accentuate the poor bias percentages for the matching variables, we find the
propensity score model applied and the Nearest Neighbour algorithm without replacement
to be sufficient in terms of defining a control group of events from the XOSL with
approximately similar characteristics as the treated MERK-group.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics PSM
The table presents descriptive data on firm characteristics from MERK, XOSL and a matched
sample selection from XOSL. mCap is market capitalisation in mNOK, Book-Market is the Book-
to-Market ratio and turnover is (Daily Volume/mCap). There are no MERK-companies within the
Industrials-sector. Thus, events within this sector are not included in the post-matching sample.
Unmatched/ Mean % % red. t-test V(T)/
Matched Treated Control Bias Bias t p>|t| V(C)
mCap U 1647.9 12777 -29.8 -1.33 0.183 0.00*
M 1074.8 1487.7 -1.1 96.3 -0.69 0.495 0.47
Book-Market U .52732 .78877 -48.0 -2.92 0.004 0.92
M .49164 .55731 -12.1 74.9 -0.36 0.719 0.88
Turnover U .00284 .00462 -22.1 -1.07 0.284 0.18*
M .00425 .00324 12.6 42.9 0.60 0.548 0.52
* if variance ratio outside [0.53; 1.89] for U and [0.45; 2.23] for M.
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4 Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodologies applied to examine abnormal returns and
trading volume related to legal insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange, and whether
being listed on Merkur Market affects abnormal returns and turnover. We will begin
this section by elaborating on the event study methodology used to measure abnormal
market reactions around announcements of insider transactions. First, we define our event,
estimation window and event windows, before we explain the calculation of abnormal
returns and abnormal volume.
Furthermore, the section presents the methodology behind the cross-sectional multiple
regression that is used to analyse the effect of being listed on MERK on market reactions
from insider trades, first on the full sample and further on the matched XOSL sample to
allow for causal interpretation.
4.1 The event study methodology
The event study methodology has been applied to investigate hypothesis I-III of the thesis
and further to obtain the dependent variables for the regression analysis. This finance
methodology is widely used to examine short-term market behaviour around events such
as regulatory changes, earning announcements or other exogenous events. In general, the
methodology is used to test how the market incorporates information and to measure the
impact an event has on shareholder wealth. For the intent of this thesis, the methodology
is applied to investigate security price and volume behaviour around announcements of
insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The approach described in the following is
derived mainly from that described by MacKinlay (1997). For measuring abnormal volume,
we use a methodology derived from Chae (2005) and Campbell and Wasley (1996).
Underlying the event study methodology there are three important assumptions. First,
the market where the events take place is semi-efficient, implying that new information is
reflected instantly in the stock price. Second, the events analysed are exogenous. Third,
the market price on the event date is only affected by the event analysed.
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4.1.1 Defining events
The first step in conducting an event study is to define the events to be analysed
(MacKinlay, 1997). As presented in Section 3, the events assessed in this thesis are trades
conducted by primary insiders on XOSL and MERK. As these trades are unscheduled
events, the exogeneity assumption seems to hold.
4.1.2 Event window
The event window is defined as the time interval in which the market effect of the event
is studied. According to MacKinlay (1997), it is beneficial to include more days than
the event date itself when constructing the event window. The reasoning behind this
is the possibility of information leakage before the event in question and lagged market
reactions. With regard to insider trades, the greater issue is the possibility of lagged
reporting. As discussed in Section 2, insiders are obliged to report their trades before the
opening of the stock exchange the following trading day. However, there are instances
where insider trades are published on NewsWeb with a greater lag. To deal with this
issue, we include the two days before the announcement in the event window and have
removed all trades where the lag from the trade is made until the announcement exceeds
two days. Including two days in advance of the insider trades allows for the analysis to
capture the full reaction from the events, should the market react before the announcement.
Furthermore, the assumption of market efficiency advocates for an expansion of the event
window beyond the event date being unnecessary. However, as daily expected returns are
close to zero, according to Fama (1998), a short window including some days after the
event is advantageous in case of small lags in market reactions.
The approach applied in this thesis is to explore several smaller event windows ranging
from two days before (-2) to three days after (+3) the event date.
4.1.3 Estimation window
According to MacKinlay (1997), the window used to estimate normal returns must not
overlap the event window. Observed returns from the event window could have an impact
on the normal return, biasing the analysis. Consequently, according to Binder (1998), a
buffer of at least one day should exist between the estimation and event window.
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The estimation window should further include a certain number of observations in order
to reduce the variance of calculated cumulative abnormal returns, according to MacKinlay
(1997). However, he argues, too wide an estimation window increases the probability of
including similar events within the same period of time. We use a 90-day estimation
window ending 20 days before the event date. This estimation window is slightly shorter
than that recommended by MacKinlay (1997) due to the regularity of insider trades,
especially on XOSL. Thus, we require observable share prices for all days of the estimation
window.
4.1.4 Measuring abnormal returns
4.1.4.1 Calculating returns
The returns used in the event study of this thesis are calculated as the percentage change
in closing price from one day to the next. Following Brown and Warner (1985), we
perform our analysis using arithmetic returns. The reason for using arithmetic returns
over logarithmic returns in the event study is due the the aggregation of returns across





Rit is the arithmetic return on company i on day t, Pit is closing price of company i on
day t and Pit 1 is closing price of company i on day t  1.
4.1.4.2 Modelling normal returns
An estimation of the market value of a stock in absence of the event is necessary in order to
assess the effect insider trades have on the market value of the firm. According to Kothari
and Warner (2008), event studies are, to a great extent, immune to misspecifications
in estimating expected return. Consequently, they argue, that abnormal announcement
returns cannot be attributed to the problem of model misspecification. The one-factor
market model, according to MacKinlay (1997), removes the portion of the return related
to variations in the market, thereby reducing abnormal return and providing increased
ability to detect event effects. Based on these arguments, we apply the market model
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when estimating normal returns. We regress returns for each stock of firms with insider
trades on the return of the Oslo Stock Exchange All-share Index (OSEAX). For security i,
the market model is specified:
E(Rit) = ↵ +  iE(Rmt) (3)
Where Rmt and Rit are period t market return and stock i return, respectively.
4.1.4.3 Abnormal returns and event portfolios
Abnormal returns of share i on day t has to be statistically significant to allow rejection
of the null hypothesis. Abnormal returns are calculated as:
ARi,t = Ri,t   E(Ri,t) (4)
ARi,t is the difference between the actual returns in the specified event window and the
expected return calculated using the market model. As we apply an event window of
multiple days in our analysis, the abnormal returns must be aggregated. Cumulative






Due to the presence of overlapping event windows in insider trades on the Oslo Stock
Exchange, we aggregate the abnormal returns for events with the same announcement
day and create equally weighted portfolios. This approach is suggested by (MacKinlay,
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Aggregating CAR for all i with the same (T3, T4). Further we use the CAR from the








In order to test whether CAARs are significant, we use the test estimator explained by





⇠ N(0, 1) (8)
According to Boehmer et al. (1991), an event-induced variance affects the strength of the
traditional event study methodology, causing rejection of H0 of zero abnormal returns too
frequently. Thus, the cumulative average abnormal returns within event window T3 to T4
are divided by the standard deviation from the estimation window T1 to T2.
4.1.5 Measuring abnormal volume
4.1.5.1 Calculating daily volume
In line with Chae (2005), Campbell and Wasley (1996) and Cready and Ramanan (1991),
we use a trading volume metric calculated as the natural logarithm of daily raw turnover.
Raw turnover is defined as trading volume divided by outstanding shares and gives a
relative measure of volume. To isolate the market reactions from the insider trade, we
adjust volume on the day of the trade. This is done by subtracting the insider’s trading
volume from the trading day identified from the cleaning of the data. To avoid the natural
logarithm of zero, a constant of .000255 is added to the raw adjusted turnover before log
transformation. Log turnover is given as:
Vit = ln(
nit   nvit + .000255
Sit
) (9)
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where nit is the number of shares traded in company i in period t and nvit is volume
traded by the insider. Sit are shares outstanding.
4.1.5.2 Modelling normal trading volume
Normal or expected trading volume can be estimated using different models. Campbell
and Wasley (1996) present three different approaches: mean adjusted trading volume,
an ordinary least squares (OLS) market model in trading volume, and an estimated
generalised least squares model (EGLS) in trading volume. We use the mean adjusted








where T is the number of days in the estimation window, f is the first and l is the last
day of the estimation window.
4.1.5.3 Abnormal volume and event portfolios
When using the mean adjusted model for estimating normal trading volume, we calculate
abnormal turnover as follows:
AVit = Vit   V̄i (11)
Furthermore, we accumulate abnormal turnover across the event windows and construct
equally weighted portfolios for overlapping event dates in the same sense as for abnormal



















The test used in our main analysis is a parametric test analysed by Ajinkya and Jain
(1989), Cready and Ramanan (1991) and Campbell and Wasley (1996). Assuming all
abnormal trading volume in company i at time t, are normal, independent and identically
distributed random variables, the following test statistic is distributed student t under
the null hypothesis (Campbell & Wasley, 1996):
CAAV (T3, T4)p
var(CAAV (T3, T4))
⇠ N(0, 1) (15)
Following the methodology of Campbell and Wasley (1996) and Chae (2005), we apply
the event window variance in our test statistic despite using estimation window variance
for abnormal return.
4.2 Cross-sectional multiple regression
The results from the event studies allow for interpretation of market reactions, but does
not allow for any causal interpretation. Nor can we conclude that market reactions
are significantly different on MERK versus XOSL. To further examine the impact of a
companies being listed on Merkur Market on market reactions from insider trades, we run
multiple cross-sectional regression models on abnormal returns and turnover.
As these models use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cumulative abnormal
turnover (CAV), we perform the regressions with log-returns when calculating CAR, as
CAR is not aggregated across securities and log-returns are advantageous for aggregation
across days in the event window. This also allows for log-log interpretation of our control
variables. We further apply the same CAV as in the event study, which is cumulative
abnormal log turnover (see Equations (11) and (12)), although not aggregated into
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where Pi,t is closing price for share i on day t. Abnormal returns and CAR is calculated
as in Equations (4) and (5), only now using log-returns and log index returns.
The models intend to test whether the potential effect of the reported insider trades on
MERK and XOSL persists when controlling for other factors, and whether there is a
causal effect between being listed on MERK and market reactions ex-post insider trades.
The methodology used is OLS regression, and we perform several regressions using CAR
and CAV in different event windows, as our dependent variable. We test four different
models, two for returns and two for turnover:
Returns:
CAR[⌧a, ⌧b] = ↵ +  1MERKi + ✏it (17)
CAR[⌧a, ⌧b] = ↵ +  1MERKi +  2ln(mCap)it
+  3BMit +  4ln(Turnover)it + ✏it
(18)
Turnover:
CAV [⌧a, ⌧b] = ↵ +  1MERKi + ✏it (19)
CAV [⌧a, ⌧b] = ↵ +  1MERKi +  2ln(mCap)it
+  3BMit +  4AbR[ 10, 3]it + ✏it
(20)
MERK is equal to one if the insider is trading in a company listed on Merkur Market, and
zero for the reference group (XOSL). ⌧a is the first day of the regressed event window, and
⌧b is the last. ln(mCap) is the log of market capitalisation, BM is the Book-Market ratio,
ln(Turnover) is the log of turnover and AbR[ 10, 3] is the difference between average
absolute return and average absolute OSEAX return from t =  10 and t =  3. The last
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term in the regression models, ✏it, is a random error term which we assume, conditional
on all model variables, to have an expected value of zero.
We control for market capitalisation as there are large differences between MERK and
XOSL firm size and it is shown to effect market reactions from insider trades. According to
Kim and Purnanandam (2006), larger companies are more closely followed by investors and
analysts, entailing less information asymmetry and thereby weaker market reactions from
information generating events. Further, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find a relationship
of higher returns post insider trade announcements in small companies, compared to
firms with larger market value, and Atiase (1985) argues that the amount of private
ex-ante information dissemination is a function of company size, implying that large cap
companies are more efficiently priced than smaller firms.
Section 3 illustrates a great difference in Book-to-Market ratio on XOSL and MERK.
Thus, Book-to-Market ratio is included as a proxy for a company being a growth-stock
(low BM) or a value stock (high BM). Rozeff and Zaman (1998) found an overreaction in
returns post announced insider trades in US growth stocks compared to value stocks.
Dierkens (1991) argues that higher intensity in trading is associated with a lower degree
of asymmetric information. This suggests that less liquid stocks should be affected to a
higher degree by new information, such as insider trade notifications. As the turnover on
XOSL and MERK differs to a great extent, we control for the log of daily turnover in our
cross-sectional regression of cumulative abnormal returns.
Stock price changes might induce insider trades, as insiders could use the opportunity to
buy (sell) shares at a discount (premium). Thus, in the cumulative abnormal turnover
model, we control for absolute return in the window [-10, -3], following Chae (2005).
In the regression models, we control for industry and time fixed effects, in order to adjust
for possible bias. Furthermore, following Petersen (2009), we cluster our standard errors
across two dimensions; company and week. SE’s clustered by firm capture the unspecified
correlation between events in the same firm across different weeks, while the SE’s clustered
by week capture the unspecified correlation between different firms in the same week.




In this section we present the results from the event study and regression analysis. Firstly,
we test hypotheses I, II and III by reviewing the short-term market reactions from legal
insider trades. Here, we examine CAAR and CAAV for purchase and sell activity across
different transaction sizes. Secondly, we investigate abnormal market reactions on XOSL
and MERK and whether there are deviations between them.
The third part of this section presents our main analysis where we examine whether being
listed on Merkur Market causes abnormal market reactions ex-post insider trades. We use
a cross-sectional regression model with MERK-listed companies as the treated group. Due
to the natural deviations in firm characteristics between the two marketplaces, a matched
sample from XOSL is used in the model for causal interpretation of the results.
5.1 Market reactions from insider trading
When investigate the market reactions from insider trades, the test statistics for CAAR
are based on arithmetic returns and estimation window variance, whilst we use logarithmic
turnover with event window variance for CAAV, due to the methodological differences
elaborated in Section 4. All CAAR and CAAV estimates are from equally weighed
portfolios for trades with the same event date.
5.1.1 Abnormal returns from insider trading on the Oslo Stock
Exchange
Table 4 shows abnormal returns for Oslo Stock Exchange companies for insider trades
aggregated for MERK and XOSL. The table is divided into two panels which consist of
market reactions from purchase versus sell activity. The panels further report abnormal
returns for small, medium and large transactions in addition to abnormal returns for
the full sample. Hereunder, small transactions are those below NOK 500,000, medium
transactions are those between NOK 500,000 and NOK 2,000,000 whilst large transactions
are those over NOK 2,000,000.
The abnormal returns from Panel A in Table 4 strongly support hypothesis I, that insider
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purchases lead to positive abnormal returns. This is further supported from the findings in
Table 16 from Appendix, using log returns as a robustness test. Abnormal returns around
purchase transactions are positive and strongly significant for all event windows across all
transaction sizes with coefficients ranging from 0.87 per cent for small transactions on the
announcement day to 2.43 per cent for medium transactions in event window [-2, 1]. These
results are of economic value, comparing them to the average daily return for our sample of
-0.01 per cent. In comparison to market reactions for the US Stock Exchange, Lakonishok
and Lee (2001) and Aktas et al. (2008) found CAARs of respectively 0.59 and 0.41 per
cent for the five days following an insider trade against 1.74 per cent in our sample.10 In
raising the question of why abnormal returns for Oslo Stock Exchange are almost three
times as high, one explanation can be the deviations in reporting regulations. The lag of
maximum two days in our sample allows for analysis of the aggregated implications of
both the occurrence of the trade and the following announcement. In contrast, Lakonishok
and Lee (2001) and Aktas et al. (2008) emphasise that there often is a large lag between
the execution of a trade and the official report, which makes it impossible to interpret the
accumulated effect of the insider trade. Information of the trade can have leaked during
this lag and would not have been captured in their results. Furthermore, the comparative
presented figures include insider trades of all sizes, whilst we look exclusively at trades
above NOK 125,000.
Moreover, the findings of Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for the UK Stock Exchange are very
much in line with our findings, with CAAR for event window [0, 1] of 1.16 per cent
against 1.65 per cent for our sample. These findings further support the argument of the
deviations in returns from the US Stock Exchange being caused by differences in reporting
regulations, as their sample withholds lags of maximum five days and an average lag of
zero. Furthermore, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) also investigates the implications of CAAR
across different transaction sizes. Here, the CAAR for UK securities is almost twice as
high as our Oslo Stock Exchange sample with 3.12 against 1.69 per cent. However, the
results are not comparable as they use a relative measure when categorising transaction
size whilst our categories are separated on absolute values.
One surprising finding from Panel A of Table 4 is that medium transactions yield higher
10All comparisons in the analysis uses CAARs from the equivalent event window from our study, to
the window used by the author referred to. Here, we assume that all trades are executed on Day -2
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or equal abnormal returns in comparison to large transactions for all event windows. This
contradicts hypothesis II, that market reactions increase in accordance with the size of the
transaction. One explanation for this can however again be the absolute size categories.
It may for example be the case that medium transactions are more often performed by
insiders in smaller companies, which are proven to generate higher abnormal returns
(Hong et al., 2000).
The coefficients from Panel B in Table 4 involving sales transactions are both less significant
and of lower economic impact, despite a much higher average transaction value with NOK
15m against NOK 4m. Firstly, some of the coefficients withholds an unexpected positive
sign, which is especially apparent for insider sales in the small transaction size category.
However, for medium and large sales transactions, all significant abnormal returns have a
negative coefficient ranging from -0.92 to -1.78 per cent. The results indicate that large
and medium insider sales are information-revealing events, but the ambiguous results for
the full sample contradicts hypothesis I that insider sales yield market reactions. Moreover,
Table 16 from Appendix show stronger evidence of negative abnormal returns from insider
sales with a statistically significant coefficient of -0.56 per cent for event window [-2, 2]
when using log returns. In addition, Panel C in Table 6 seems to report some evidence of
information content in sales transactions on XOSL, where CAAR for event window [-2, 2]
is negative 0.47 per cent and statistically significant.
Further, from Table 4 seems to provide evidence for hypothesis III, entailing that absolute
market reactions are higher for purchase transactions than sales transactions. For the main
event window [-2, 2], the absolute CAAR is more than five times higher for purchases than
sales, with the sales coefficient also being economically insignificant. This is in line with
the finding that have been highlighted by Lakonishok and Lee (2001), who find that US
purchase transactions on average have absolute abnormal returns four times larger than
their findings for insider sales and by Fidrmuc et al. (2006), who find that price reactions
to purchase transactions in the UK sample are almost three times as large as for sales.
One explanation for this may be that markets interpret the insider sales as withholding
less information content. It may be that insider sales are interpreted as liquidation needs
or risk-adjusting behaviour more than information revealing events. Furthermore, there
are fewer observations for insider sales which may have implications.
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In sum, we find that there are positive abnormal returns around insider purchases. The
magnitude of the returns is larger than for comparable studies of the US stock market,
which we expect may be due to speedier reporting and differences in regulations for
the transactions in the sample. The findings for insider sales are more ambiguous, but
our results indicate that absolute returns are larger for purchase transactions than sell
transactions.
Table 4: Price reactions to insider trades
according to transaction size categories
The table reports CAARs for insider purchase and sale transactions across transaction size categories
around the event date. The sample includes all reported insider trades from 01.01.2017 to 28.02.2020
above NOK 125,000, including both MERK and XOSL. The main event window is [-2, 2] as some insider
trades are reported with a two-day lag. Other event windows are included for robustness. CAARs are
measured in arithmetic returns, where the market model has been utilised to calculate   with estimation
window [-110, -20]. Insider trades that have the same event time have been aggregated into equally
weighted portfolios to reduce covariance. Panel A reports insider purchases whilst panel B reports
insider sales. The panels show CAARs for the full sample, small transactions, medium transactions
and large transactions. Small transactions are trades below NOK 500,000. Medium transactions are
trades between NOK 500,000 and NOK 2,000,000. Large transactions are trades over NOK 2,000,000.
CAAR
[0, 0] [0, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 2] [-1, 3] [-2, 0] [-2, 1] [-2, 2]
Panel A: Purchases
All 1.18%⇤⇤⇤ 1.65%⇤⇤⇤ 1.67%⇤⇤⇤ 1.83%⇤⇤⇤ 2.00%⇤⇤⇤ 1.10%⇤⇤⇤ 1.58%⇤⇤⇤ 1.74%⇤⇤⇤
N=554 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Small 0.87%⇤⇤⇤ 1.26%⇤⇤⇤ 1.05%⇤⇤⇤ 1.53%⇤⇤⇤ 1.84%⇤⇤⇤ 0.72%⇤⇤⇤ 1.11%⇤⇤⇤ 1.59%⇤⇤⇤
N=212 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Medium 1.63%⇤⇤⇤ 2.12%⇤⇤⇤ 2.41%⇤⇤⇤ 2.02%⇤⇤⇤ 2.20%⇤⇤⇤ 1.95%⇤⇤⇤ 2.43%⇤⇤⇤ 2.03%⇤⇤⇤
N=167 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Large 1.13%⇤⇤⇤ 1.69%⇤⇤⇤ 1.70%⇤⇤⇤ 2.02%⇤⇤⇤ 2.00%⇤⇤⇤ 0.76%⇤⇤⇤ 1.32%⇤⇤⇤ 1.64%⇤⇤⇤
N=175 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel B: Sales
All 0.09% 0.42%⇤ -0.52%⇤⇤ -0.51%⇤⇤ -0.25% -0.67%⇤⇤ -0.34% -0.33%
N=171 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Small 0.54% 1.53%⇤⇤⇤ 1.13%⇤⇤⇤ 1.01%⇤⇤⇤ 0.71%⇤⇤ 0.20% 1.19%⇤⇤⇤ 1.07%⇤⇤⇤
N=47 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium -0.08% 0.05% -0.94%⇤ -0.60% -0.24% -1.78%⇤⇤⇤ -1.65%⇤⇤⇤ -1.30%⇤⇤
N=56 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Large -0.09% -0.05% -1.32%⇤⇤⇤ -1.50%⇤⇤⇤ -0.92%⇤⇤ -0.35% -0.32% -0.49%
N=68 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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5.1.2 Abnormal turnover from insider trading on the Oslo Stock
Exchange
Table 5 reports abnormal trading volumes across transaction type and size for the full
sample. The market reactions have been divided into the same size categories as in
subsection 5.1.1, labeled Small, Medium and Large.
Panel A and B show that there are positive abnormal turnover in reaction to all reported
insider trades. The positive turnover is both economically and statistically significant,
where cumulative turnover increases by 6.29 per cent for insider purchases and 5.13 per
cent for insider sales from estimated daily trading volume for event window [-2, 2]. There
are no previous studies examining abnormal turnover ex-post insider trades. However,
comparison can be made to Chae (2005) and his study on abnormal volumes in relation
to unscheduled acquisition, target and Moody’s ratings announcements. Chae (2005)
finds that on the announcement day, turnover increases by 33.02 per cent for acquisitions,
98.63 per cent for target and 5.40 for Moody’s ratings. In comparison, the increase in
turnover on the event day in our sample is 2.20 per cent for insider purchases and 1.96
per cent for insider sales. Despite the magnitude of increased turnover found in Chae’s
study being much larger, this is expected due to the difference in information content of
the investigated events. Chae (2005) examine the impact of major corporate events which
reveal material information that have a substantial impact on price, while insider trades
only provide an indication of the direction of the stock price. On the back of this, the
abnormal turnovers from Table 5 are quite substantial given the information content.
Furthermore, Table 5 also supports hypothesis III that market reactions are stronger for
purchase transactions than sales transactions, seeing that abnormal volumes are higher
for purchases than sales for all event windows, with the exception of event windows [-2, 0]
and [-2, 2] for large transactions.
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Table 5: Turnover reactions to insider trades
according to transaction size categories
The table reports CAAVs for insider purchase and sale transactions across transaction size categories
around the event date. The sample includes all reported insider trades from 01.01.2017 to
28.02.2020 above NOK 125,000, including both MERK and XOSL. The main event window is [-
2, 2] as some insider trades in the sample are reported with a two-day lag. Other event windows
are included for robustness. CAAV is measured using log abnormal turnover, where estimated
normal turnover is calculated using the mean adjusted model with estimation window [-40, -11].
The coefficients from the table give the abnormal turnover in reference to the mean. Insider
trades that have the same event time have been aggregated into equally weighted portfolios
to reduce covariance. Panel A reports insider purchases whilst panel B reports insider sales.
The panels show CAAVs for the full sample, small transactions, medium transactions and large
transactions. Small transactions are trades below NOK 500,000. Medium transactions are trades
between NOK 500,000 and NOK 2,000,000. Large transactions are trades over NOK 2,000,000.
CAAV
[0, 0] [0, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 2] [-1, 3] [-2, 0] [-2, 1] [-2, 2]
Panel A: Purchases
Total 2.202⇤⇤⇤ 3.421⇤⇤⇤ 4.569⇤⇤⇤ 5.449⇤⇤⇤ 5.926⇤⇤⇤ 4.191⇤⇤⇤ 5.411⇤⇤⇤ 6.291⇤⇤⇤
N=565 (0.10) (0.20) (0.27) (0.37) (0.46) (0.29) (0.35) (0.44)
Small 2.481⇤⇤⇤ 3.749⇤⇤⇤ 4.991⇤⇤⇤ 6.059⇤⇤⇤ 6.669⇤⇤⇤ 4.618⇤⇤⇤ 5.886⇤⇤⇤ 6.953⇤⇤⇤
N=220 (0.19) (0.37) (0.50) (0.67) (0.81) (0.48) (0.61) (0.76)
Medium 1.970⇤⇤⇤ 3.083⇤⇤⇤ 4.285⇤⇤⇤ 5.276⇤⇤⇤ 5.865⇤⇤⇤ 4.461⇤⇤⇤ 5.574⇤⇤⇤ 6.566⇤⇤⇤
N=168 (0.17) (0.32) (0.46) (0.61) (0.72) (0.48) (0.58) (0.73)
Large 2.075⇤⇤⇤ 3.335⇤⇤⇤ 4.312⇤⇤⇤ 4.855⇤⇤⇤ 5.062⇤⇤⇤ 3.405⇤⇤⇤ 4.665⇤⇤⇤ 5.208⇤⇤⇤
N=177 (0.15) (0.33) (0.45) (0.61) (0.81) (0.54) (0.63) (0.78)
Panel B: Sales
Total 1.964⇤⇤⇤ 2.903⇤⇤⇤ 3.650⇤⇤⇤ 4.484⇤⇤⇤ 4.933⇤⇤⇤ 3.353⇤⇤⇤ 4.292⇤⇤⇤ 5.126⇤⇤⇤
N=171 (0.16) (0.36) (0.47) (0.63) (0.80) (0.42) (0.55) (0.70)
Small 2.195⇤⇤⇤ 3.256⇤⇤⇤ 3.741⇤⇤⇤ 4.428⇤⇤⇤ 4.468⇤⇤ 2.869⇤⇤⇤ 3.930⇤⇤⇤ 4.617⇤⇤⇤
N=47 (0.32) (0.77) (1.07) (1.45) (1.72) (0.91) (1.17) (1.52)
Medium 1.700⇤⇤⇤ 2.834⇤⇤⇤ 3.547⇤⇤⇤ 4.568⇤⇤⇤ 5.668⇤⇤⇤ 3.017⇤⇤⇤ 4.151⇤⇤⇤ 5.172⇤⇤⇤
N=56 (0.23) (0.54) (0.68) (0.78) (0.87) (0.64) (0.80) (0.92)
Large 2.022⇤⇤⇤ 2.716⇤⇤⇤ 3.673⇤⇤⇤ 4.454⇤⇤⇤ 4.650⇤⇤⇤ 3.963⇤⇤⇤ 4.657⇤⇤⇤ 5.439⇤⇤⇤
N=68 (0.28) (0.59) (0.74) (1.06) (1.45) (0.66) (0.92) (1.23)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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5.2 Market reactions from insider trading on MERK
versus XOSL
This part of the analysis discusses abnormal market reactions across the marketplace
on which companies are listed on. We examine both abnormal returns and abnormal
turnover for MERK versus XOSL. Based on the findings from subsection 5.1.1, that sales
transactions do not seem to yield significant abnormal returns, in addition to there being
only five sales transactions on Merkur Market, the results for sales will be less emphasised.
Due to the limited sample size on Merkur Market, there will be no discussion of the
implications of insider sales on this exchange, nor comparison of sales transactions across
the marketplaces. Reference to abnormal market reactions on Merkur Market therefore
only refers to purchase transactions. However, sales transactions are included in the
tables to check for implications of insider sales transactions on XOSL compared to the
full sample.
From Table 6, we see that abnormal returns for MERK are higher than XOSL across all
event windows. For example, for event window [-2, 2], MERK CAAR is 6.63 per cent
compared to 1.74 per cent for the full sample and 1.40 per cent for XOSL. This represents
a difference in average abnormal return of over 5 per cent between the two marketplaces.
The abnormal returns for Merkur Market are also almost five times higher than those
that Fidrmuc et al. (2006) found for UK firms. The accumulated average abnormal return
for MERK versus XOSL from two days before the announcement of inside purchases until
three days after is further illustrated in Figure 3.
When discussing the reasoning for the deviations across the marketplaces, we highlight
characteristics that can affect abnormal returns that deviate across the marketplaces.
Merkur Market aims to enable small and high-growth firms, which characterises the sample
firms from this marketplace. The mean market capitalisation of Merkur Market firms is
NOK 1.0bn against NOK 14.7bn for XOSL. For Book-to-Market ratios, the values are
respectively 0.53 against 0.76. With regard to firm size, Chari et al. (1988) found that for
earnings announcements, the excess return on the event day for small firms was 8.25 per
cent whilst there were no significant abnormal returns for large firms, indicating that the
difference in firm size contributes towards higher abnormal returns on Merkur Market.
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For growth characteristics, Aboody and Lev (2000) found firms with high relative R&D
expenditure obtain abnormal returns that are twice the size compared with no R&D firms
on the event day. This is in line with our findings with abnormal returns on the event day
of 2.62 per cent for MERK and 1.08 per cent for XOSL.
Table 6: Price reactions to insider trades
according to marketplace
The table show CAARs around the event date for insider trades across the different marketplaces
in the sample for buy and sell transactions. The sample includes all reported insider trades on
XOSL and MERK from 01.01.2017 to 28.02.2020 above NOK 125,000. Panel A reports CAARs
from the aggregated sample separated into buy and sell transactions. Panel B reports CAARs
from MERK transactions and Panel C from XOSL transactions. The main event window is [-2,
2] as some insider trades in the sample are reported with a two-day lag. Other event windows
are included for robustness. CAARs are measured in arithmetic returns, where the market model
has been utilised to calculate   with estimation window [-110, -20]. Insider trades that have the
same event time have been aggregated into equally weighted portfolios to eliminate covariance.
CAAR
[0, 0] [0, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 2] [-1, 3] [-2, 0] [-2, 1] [-2, 2]
Panel A: Full sample
Purchases 1.18%⇤⇤⇤ 1.65%⇤⇤⇤ 1.67%⇤⇤⇤ 1.83%⇤⇤⇤ 2.00%⇤⇤⇤ 1.10%⇤⇤⇤ 1.58%⇤⇤⇤ 1.74%⇤⇤⇤
N=554 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales 0.09% 0.42%⇤ -0.52%⇤⇤ -0.51%⇤⇤ -0.25% -0.67%⇤⇤ -0.34% -0.33%
N=171 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel B: MERK
Purchases 2.62%⇤⇤⇤ 3.28%⇤⇤⇤ 5.17%⇤⇤⇤ 6.16%⇤⇤⇤ 7.80%⇤⇤⇤ 4.99%⇤⇤⇤ 5.64%⇤⇤⇤ 6.63%⇤⇤⇤
N=36 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Sales 1.41% 2.05%⇤⇤ 2.59%⇤⇤ 6.55%⇤⇤⇤ 9.35%⇤⇤⇤ -0.34% 0.31% 0.43%
N=5 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Panel C: XOSL
Purchases 1.08%⇤⇤⇤ 1.54%⇤⇤⇤ 1.42%⇤⇤⇤ 1.53%⇤⇤⇤ 1.60%⇤⇤⇤ 0.83%⇤⇤⇤ 1.29%⇤⇤⇤ 1.40%⇤⇤⇤
N=518 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales 0.05% 0.37% -0.62%⇤⇤ -0.73%⇤⇤ -0.53%⇤ -0.68%⇤⇤ -0.36% -0.47%⇤
N=166 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Figure 3: Cumulative average abnormal return
across marketplaces, purchase transactions
The figure illustrates average cumulative abnormal arithmetic return for the equally weighed
portfolios in the window [-2, 3] for all purchase transactions, sorted by marketplace.
Table 7 shows abnormal turnover for MERK versus XOSL. In line with hypothesis IV, it
is apparent that the coefficients for abnormal turnover are also much higher on MERK in
comparison with XOSL. Cumulative average abnormal turnover from two days before the
announcement of a purchase three days after is further illustrated in Figure 4. For event
window [-2, 2] XOSL turnover increase by 5.45 per cent, whilst for MERK the coefficient is
16.50 per cent. Moreover, the market reactions in terms of abnormal turnover for MERK
are quite striking where the turnover on the event day increases by 5.12 per cent from the
average, which is only marginally smaller than the increase of 5.40 per cent for Moody’s
ratings from Chae (2005). This is surprising as Moody’s ratings are events that contain
information that is material to the stock price, in contrast to insider trades.
As it is shown that abnormal trading volume around information generating events
increases with higher degrees of information asymmetry (Kyle, 1985), it can be discussed
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that also the deviations in trading volume between the marketplaces can be explained by
characteristics such as size and growth versus value firms.
Table 7: Turnover reactions to insider trades
according to marketplace
The table show CAAVs around the event date for insider trades across the different marketplaces in
the sample for buy and sell transactions. The sample includes all reported insider trades on XOSL
and MERK from 01.01.2017 to 28.02.2020 above NOK 125,000. Panel A reports CAAVs from the
aggregated sample separated into buy and sell transactions. Panel B reports CAAVs from MERK
transactions and Panel C from XOSL transactions. The main event window is [-2, 2] as some insider
trades in the sample are reported with a two-day lag. Other event windows are included for robustness.
CAAV is measured using log abnormal turnover, where estimated normal turnover is calculated
using the mean adjusted model with estimation window [-40, -11]. The coefficients from the table
give the abnormal turnover in reference to the mean. Insider trades that have the same event time
have been aggregated into equally weighted portfolios to eliminate covariance between securities.
CAAV
[0, 0] [0, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 2] [-1, 3] [-2, 0] [-2, 1] [-2, 2]
Panel A: Full sample
Purchases 2.202⇤⇤⇤ 3.421⇤⇤⇤ 4.569⇤⇤⇤ 5.449⇤⇤⇤ 5.926⇤⇤⇤ 4.191⇤⇤⇤ 5.411⇤⇤⇤ 6.291⇤⇤⇤
N=565 (0.10) (0.20) (0.27) (0.37) (0.46) (0.29) (0.35) (0.44)
Sales 1.964⇤⇤⇤ 2.903⇤⇤⇤ 3.650⇤⇤⇤ 4.484⇤⇤⇤ 4.933⇤⇤⇤ 3.353⇤⇤⇤ 4.292⇤⇤⇤ 5.126⇤⇤⇤
N=171 (0.16) (0.36) (0.47) (0.63) (0.80) (0.42) (0.55) (0.70)
Panel B: MERK
Purchases 5.120⇤⇤⇤ 7.672⇤⇤⇤ 10.590⇤⇤⇤ 13.590⇤⇤⇤ 13.670⇤⇤⇤ 10.950⇤⇤⇤ 13.510⇤⇤⇤ 16.500⇤⇤⇤
N=43 (0.78) (1.37) (1.75) (2.34) (2.64) (1.65) (2.03) (2.61)
Sales 2.978 5.199 7.119 9.811 14.930 6.353 8.574 11.260
N=5 (2.28) (4.27) (6.13) (8.64) (10.10) (5.69) (7.70) (10.20)
Panel C: XOSL
Purchases 1.962⇤⇤⇤ 3.071⇤⇤⇤ 4.073⇤⇤⇤ 4.779⇤⇤⇤ 5.288⇤⇤⇤ 3.634⇤⇤⇤ 4.744⇤⇤⇤ 5.450⇤⇤⇤
N=522 (0.08) (0.18) (0.25) (0.34) (0.44) (0.27) (0.33) (0.41)
Sales 1.934⇤⇤⇤ 2.834⇤⇤⇤ 3.546⇤⇤⇤ 4.324⇤⇤⇤ 4.632⇤⇤⇤ 3.262⇤⇤⇤ 4.163⇤⇤⇤ 4.941⇤⇤⇤
N=166 (0.15) (0.35) (0.45) (0.60) (0.76) (0.40) (0.52) (0.67)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Figure 4: Cumulative average abnormal turnover
across marketplaces, purchase transactions
The figure illustrates cumulative average abnormal log turnover for the equally weighted
portfolios in the window [-2, 3] for all purchase transactions, sorted by marketplace.
Overall, there are large deviations in both CAAR and CAAV for MERK and XOSL firms.
We suggest that there are contradicting firm characteristics across the two marketplaces
caused by the nature of the marketplaces that can likely explain some of the gap in market
reactions. However, we argue that due to fewer regulations and less transparency on
Merkur Market, some of the market reaction surplus ex-post insider purchases may be
explained by the marketplace on which Oslo Stock Exchange firms choose to list.
5.3 The effect of marketplace on market reactions from
insider purchases
In this part, we investigate whether being listed on Merkur Market affects market reactions
from insider purchases on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Firstly, we present the cross-sectional
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regression model for abnormal returns and turnover for the full sample, before regressing
on matched XOSL companies in order to see if any causal interpretation is possible. The
methodology is explained in Section 4, whilst the approach for creating the matched
sample from XOSL (the control group) is elaborated in Section 3. The treatment in the
regression model is defined as being listed on Merkur Market. We also include control
variables for firm size and Book-to-Market ratio. In addition, we control for turnover in
the model for abnormal returns and for absolute returns before the event for the model
on abnormal turnover.
The main event window is set to [-2, 2] due to a maximum lag of notification of trade of two
days in the sample. We emphasise the results where we adjust for both industry-specific
and time-specific fixed effects. Furthermore, standard errors are double clustered on firm
and event time. We assume that there will be correlation in the residuals within firms
and therefore adjust for this. Furthermore, we also cluster on event week as there are
instances of overlapping event windows in the sample.
5.3.1 Market reactions from insider purchases on the Oslo Stock
Exchange
Table 8 show regressions for CAR and CAV in event window [-2, 2] for all events in the
sample. Full-sample regressions for different model specifications and event windows are
found in Table 18, 19, 20 and 21 in the Appendix and are generally in line the findings
from Table 8.
Column (1) from Table 8 confirms that abnormal returns from insider trades are
significantly higher for MERK companies than XOSL companies with a coefficient of 5.88
per cent. Estimated abnormal returns for XOSL is here 1.17 per cent, which entails a
major gap in insider gains for the different marketplaces. When controlling for market
capitalisation, Book-to-Market ratio and turnover, the MERK coefficient falls to 5.10.
However, this is still both statistically and economically meaningful compared to the
average daily return of -0.01 per cent for the full sample. From column (3) we see that also
turnover is significantly higher for companies listed on Merkur Market, with an increase
in abnormal turnover of 4.88 per cent for companies on this marketplace. However,
when including the control variables, the coefficient is lower and no longer statistically
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significant.
Furthermore, we see that firm size is significantly and negatively correlated with both
abnormal returns (Column (2)) and abnormal turnover (Column (4)). This is in line with
expectations, confirming the findings of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Hong et al. (2000)
and Chae (2005). The model estimates that a 1 per cent increase in market capitalisation
is followed by a 0.007 per cent decrease in CAR and a 0.704 per cent decrease in CAV.
The coefficient for Book-to-Market ratio also has an expected negative sign for both
returns and turnover, supporting the findings of Rozeff and Zaman (1998). However, the
coefficient is not significant for CAR nor for CAV. Turnover has an unexpected positive
sign (Column (2)), although marginal and insignificant. Nor no implications can be drawn
from the coefficient for absolute returns ex-ante insider trades (Column (4)), where the
standard error is larger than the coefficient.
Overall, we find that abnormal returns and turnover from insider trades are indeed
significantly larger on Merkur Market. However, we further find evidence that other
variables also correlate with market reactions from the transactions. These are
characteristics that deviate largely across the two marketplaces, thereby hindering causal
interpretation. In the further, we therefore present regression models on a XOSL sample
that match the firm characteristics of the Merkur Market sample to investigate whether
causal inference can be made between the marketplace companies are listed on and
market reactions from insider trades.
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Table 8: Market reactions from insider
purchases on the Oslo Stock Exchange
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAR and CAV from insider purchases as the
dependent variable. Event window [-2, 2] is applied. The sample consists of all purchase transactions
from MERK and XOSL. The CAR is calculated using   from the market model with estimation
window [-110, -20]. CAV is measured using log abnormal turnover, where estimated normal turnover is
calculated using the mean adjusted model with estimation window [-40, -11]. Purchases with values
below NOK 125,000 are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to one for companies listed on
Merkur Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalisation in mNOK. Book-Market is
the Book-to-Market ratio. Ln(Turnover) is the logarithmic turnover (volume/mCap). Abs. return
[-10, -3] is the difference between absolute return and absolute OSEAX return from t = -10 and t = -3.
CAR CAV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2]
MERK 0.0588* 0.0510* 4.883* 3.681







Abs. return [-10, -3] 1.801
(5.417)
Constant 0.0117* 0.0822*** 3.620*** 9.282***
(0.00605) (0.0209) (0.782) (2.537)
adj. R2 0.038 0.053 0.081 0.094
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1104 1104 1104 1104
5.3.2 The effect of being listed on MERK on abnormal returns
from insider purchases
Table 9 reports the regression results for the matched sample with logarithmic CAR as
the dependent variable. We observe that the treatment coefficient for Merkur Market
is positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. The coefficient
from column (4) suggest that insider gains from a purchase increase by 6.63 per cent for
event window [-2, 2] given that the company is listed on Merkur Market. The effect of
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being listed on Merkur Market is reduced to 5.60 per cent when adjusting for firm size,
Book-to-Market and turnover. However, the coefficient is significant and represents a
substantial potential gain for insiders. The findings from event window [-2, 1] from Table
22 in the Appendix supports these findings, although the results for event window [-1, 2]
and [0, 0] give the same implications, but are insignificant. We argue that due to lag in
reporting, it is sensible to include the two days before the announcement of the purchase
as the sum of the standard deviation and mean in the reporting lag is north of one for
Merkur Market (Table 2 and 12). Further, Figure 3 suggest that a large proportion of
abnormal returns occur from day -2 to -1, especially for Merkur Market companies.
Table 9: Abnormal returns from insider
purchases for MERK and XOSL matched sample
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAR from insider purchases with
event window [-2, 2] as the dependent variable. The sample consists of a propensity-score
matched sample of MERK and XOSL transactions. The CAR is calculated using   from
the market model with estimation window [-110, -20]. Purchases with values below NOK
125,000 are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for companies listed on
Merkur Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalisation in millions. Book-
Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Ln(Turnover) is the logarithmic turnover (volume/mCap).
CAR [-2, 2]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MERK 0.0724⇤ 0.0724⇤⇤ 0.0626⇤ 0.0663⇤⇤ 0.0619⇤ 0.0652⇤ 0.0535⇤ 0.0560⇤
(0.0381) (0.0319) (0.0314) (0.0325) (0.0337) (0.0342) (0.0306) (0.0329)
ln(mCap) -0.00972 -0.00857 -0.0125 -0.0117
(0.00979) (0.00934) (0.00746) (0.00720)
Book-Market -0.0458 -0.00860 -0.0189 0.0112
(0.0344) (0.0635) (0.0336) (0.0491)
ln(Turnover) -0.000251 -0.0000116 0.00283 0.00259
(0.00629) (0.00589) (0.00609) (0.00537)
Constant 0.0258⇤ -0.0240 -0.0158 -0.0317 0.115⇤ 0.0460 0.103⇤ 0.0513
(0.0151) (0.0247) (0.0334) (0.0358) (0.0646) (0.0788) (0.0550) (0.0747)
adj. R2 0.074 0.134 0.152 0.146 0.098 0.087 0.132 0.109
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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5.3.3 The effect of being listed on MERK on abnormal turnover
from insider purchases
Table 10 shows the regression analysis for event window [-2, 2] with the cumulative
abnormal log turnover as the dependent variable. The results suggests that there are
significant effects from being listed on Merkur Market on abnormal turnover from insider
trades, despite insignificant results from the full-sample regression. From column (8) we
find a significant 3.76 per cent increase in turnover from being listed on Merkur Market,
thus providing evidence for hypothesis V. Event window [-2, 1] from Table 23 in the
Appendix further support these findings with a significant coefficient of 3.47 per cent. It
is though clear from Table 23 and 10 that the coefficients for other event windows and
model specifications with the exception of column (6) are insignificant.
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Table 10: Abnormal turnover from insider
purchases for MERK and XOSL matched sample
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic abnormal turnover from insider purchases
as the dependent variable. The sample consists of a propensity-score matched sample of MERK
and XOSL transactions. CAV is measured using log abnormal turnover, where estimated normal
turnover is calculated using the mean adjusted model with estimation window [-40, -11]. The
coefficients from the table give the abnormal turnover in reference to the mean. Purchases
with values below NOK 125,000 are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
companies listed on Merkur Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalisation
in millions. Book-Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Abs. return [-10, -3] is the difference
between average absolute return and average absolute OSEAX return from t =  10 and t =  3.
CAV [-2, 2]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MERK 5.419 5.419 4.785 5.106 4.093 3.854⇤ 4.143 3.756⇤
(4.246) (3.670) (3.620) (3.532) (2.702) (2.227) (2.611) (2.237)
ln(mCap) -0.594 -0.599 -0.737 -0.749
(1.134) (1.087) (1.087) (1.071)
Book-Market -4.960⇤ -3.944 -4.537⇤ -4.596
(2.563) (3.853) (2.430) (3.173)
Abs. return [-10, -3] 4.805 7.515 3.426 6.289
(10.24) (10.89) (9.577) (10.08)
Constant 7.656⇤⇤⇤ 3.421 3.405 1.674 14.53⇤⇤ 13.17⇤ 12.70 12.78⇤
(2.488) (2.062) (4.022) (3.426) (6.830) (7.517) (7.601) (7.282)
adj. R2 0.040 0.092 0.086 0.087 0.100 0.087 0.099 0.079
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Overall, our results indicate that being listed on Merkur Market yields a surplus in
abnormal returns of 5.60 per cent ex-post an insider purchase. Furthermore, we find
evidence that turnover increases by 3.76 per cent as a result of being listed on Merkur
Market. These are economically significant results and imply that information content is
lower on MERK compared to XOSL.
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6 Limitations
It is important to highlight that the findings from our analysis should be carefully
interpreted on the back of limitations of the study. Firstly, all data collected on insider
trades is manually registered by the authors, as there exists no available database of Oslo
Stock Exchange NewsWeb notifications. The manual data collection entails risk of human
error in the registration of events, as well as misinterpretation of the notifications of insider
trades. Despite constructing strict rules before commencing the manual collection of data,
there is always a possibility of different interpretation of seemingly similar notifications.
The event study assumptions discussed in Section 4 have some limitations that needs to
be adressed. Firstly, the assumption of semi-efficient markets, meaning that share prices
consistently reflect all public available information is hard to validate, as for example lag
in information flow could deem this condition impossible to fulfill. Second, the condition
of event date price only being affected by the event analysed could be flawed. Events
could occur simultaneously or be anticipated, leading to biased estimates. Following this,
the estimated market reaction to an event could be falsely attributed to the event in
question. Furthermore, not aggregating our event portfolios for overlaps regarding all days
in the event window could result in a problem of cross-sectional dependence. Constructing
aggregated portfolios of trades happening on the same date adjusts for some of this bias,
but there is still a possibility of events within the same event window being correlated in
the cross-section.
Further, the most distinct limitation is considered to be the size of our data sample. The
papers and findings of other authors we reference throughout our thesis provide analyses
based on datasets of daily observations spanning over several decades. As Merkur Market
opened for trading in 2016, this self-imposed limitation has reduced the possible size of
our dataset significantly. In the second part of our analysis, as we perform propensity
score matching on two differing groups, and further remove some outliers from Merkur
Market, the matched dataset consists of a number of observations on the limit of what is
sufficient in order to causally interpret the results. Hence, this fact needs to be considered
when analysing our findings.
As being listed on Merkur Market is defined as our treatment in order to enable causal
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interpretation of our regression analysis, the design of our dataset inables us to match
events on MERK and XOSL on pre-treatment characteristics. This imposes a challenge
when the conditional independence assumption (CIA) from the propensity score matching
methodology is evaluated. As the CIA requires that the outcome variable (CAR or CAV
in our case) must be independent of treatment conditional on the propensity score, this
assumption is hard to conclude as fulfilled as companies "self-select" themselves to be
listed on Merkur Market, and this choice is likely based on the characteristics of the
company. Thus, as it is highly possible that the Merkur-listed companies have the returns
we observe due to their specific characteristics, which caused them to apply for listing on




This thesis provides an important contribution to the literature on insider trading and its
information content on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We investigate market reactions from
insider trades on the Oslo Stock Exchange and examine the existence of causal inference
between the sub-marketplace companies are listed on and market reactions from insider
trades. Merkur Market impose more lax regulations, which we hypothesised increases
information imbalance between insiders and outside investors and thereby causes stronger
market reactions from insider trades. Several notable conclusions arise from the study.
Firstly, consistent with previous literature from other stock exchanges, we find that insider
purchases on the Oslo Stock Exchange yield significant short-term market reactions, both
in terms of abnormal returns and turnover. We find market reactions of 1.74 and 6.29
per cent respectively. The implications of insider sales transactions are more ambiguous,
suggesting that the information content from sales transactions is lesser. Secondly, both
abnormal return and abnormal turnover from insider purchases are significantly higher on
MERK compared to XOSL. This is in line with previous findings, that market reactions
to information generating announcements are higher in information asymmetry.11
Most interestingly, we find that there are surplus market reactions in regard to insider
trades from being listed on Merkur Market. Our findings suggest an increase of 5.60 per
cent in abnormal returns and 3.76 per cent in abnormal turnover ex-post insider purchases
from being listed on MERK. The results are both statistically and economically meaningful
and suggest that material information from MERK-listed companies is not disclosed to
the same extent as for XOSL listed companies. For those concerned by market inefficiency
and its consequences, our results point out that the regulatory framework for Merkur
Market seems to increase information asymmetry, which is ultimately hurting outside
investors. This again contradicts Oslo Stock Exchange’s announced goal for MERK to
be an efficient and transparent marketplace. We suggest that regulations for information
disclosure should be more equalised across the sub-marketplaces in order to increase
market efficiency and enable market prices to better reflect information.
11Assuming that information asymmetry is higher for MERK than for XOSL, due to firm characteristics
and more lax regulations.
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7.1 Suggestions for further research
As highlighted, the emergence of Merkur Market is relatively recent. This limits the number
of companies and datapoints in our sample and tampers the possibility for conducting
robust studies on the implications of being listed on this marketplace. It is therefore a
natural suggestion for further research to conduct our study at a later date when there
are more available datapoints. Moreover, there are equivalent sub-marketplaces on other
exchanges, such as Nasdaq First North Growth Market, that have longer lifespans and
consequently more data. It could be of interest to investigate whether similar effects can
be found on such exchanges.
The dataset created for the purpose of this thesis could also be used for further analysis
on insider trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange. An interesting approach would be to
investigate the profitability aspect of insider trading more thoroughly by conducting a
study in line with that of Eckbo and Smith (1998) and examine whether there is a difference
in the long-term profitability of insider trading on MERK versus XOSL by constructing
portfolios that follow insiders’ buy and sell activity across the two marketplaces and
compare returns to the benchmark index.
Furthermore, at the time at which this thesis is written, insider trades is the information
generating event with the most announcements on Merkur Market. However, as the
marketplace matures and the number of listed companies on the exchange increases,
it will enable examination of market reactions from other events. We believe it would
be interesting to conduct an equivalent study investigating the effect of being listed on
Merkur Market on abnormal returns and turnover from events containing information
that is material for the stock price. This includes earning announcements, seasoned equity
offerings or target and acquisition announcements.
Lastly, we suggest performing the study with high frequency data. This allows for a
more fine-tuned analysis of lag in market reaction between the two marketplaces, enabling
backtesting of different intraday strategies including shares of differing liquidity. As the
traction around Merkur Market has increased dramatically only considering 2020 alone, it
could be interesting to assess whether the most liquid stocks listed on MERK still have
more significant reactions to market events compared to XOSL-listed companies.
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Appendix
Table 11: Requirements on MERK vs. XOSL
Requirement MERK XOSL
Spread of share ownership
(proportion of share capital
distributed among the
general public)
10 per cent 25 per cent
Number of shareholders each
holding shares with a value
of at least NOK 10,000





No minimum market capitalisation 300
Operating result must be
positive
No No
History and activity At least one annual or interim







Minimum price per share NOK 1,- NOK 10,-
Listing prospectus No duty to prepare a listing prospectus.
Must instead publish an admission
document in accordance with specific
content requirements, which will
be inspected and reviewed by the
marketplace.
Yes
Financial reporting IFRS, Norwegian GAAP or other
recognised accounting standards
IFRS
Liquidity No requirement for sufficient liquidity
to operate for 12 months
Sufficient liquidity
for 12 months
Type of company Private limited companies, public




Board of directors At least one board member must have
satisfactory expertise in respect of the





Information collected from Oslo Stock Exchange (2020b)
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A Descriptive statistics
Table 12: Descriptive statistics, exchange type,
full data timespan
The table illustrates the mean, median, standard deviation, min and max values of
variables market capitalisation (in mNOK), daily traded volume (in thousands), daily
volume turnover, book-market-ratio, transaction value (in tNOK), daily arithmetic
returns, daily log-returns, log daily Turnover and notification delay (amount of days
from transaction to notification on NewsWeb), by exchange in the period 30.06.2016 –
01.04.2020 for Merkur Market (MERK) and Oslo Stock Exchange main market (XOSL).
Mean Median SD Min Max .
MERK
mCap 964 286 1,717 13 10,086
VOL 29.64 1.20 136.78 0.00 3059.80
Turnover 0.00066 0.00005 0.00296 0.00000 0.10640
Book-Market 0.527 0.321 0.574 -1.234 3.385
Transaction value 4,985 800 10,706 137 51,000
Returns (arith.) 0.0007 0.0000 0.0507 -0.3089 0.4814
ln(Returns) -0.0005 0.0000 0.0498 -0.3694 0.3930
ln(Turnover) -12.12 -9.97 4.95 -20.96 -3.05
Delay 0.58 0.00 0.72 0.00 2.00
XOSL
mCap 14,705 2,725 60,952 44 711,802
VOL 481.04 62.10 1435.52 0.00 22382.40
Turnover 0.00222 0.00077 0.00646 0.00000 0.58450
Book-Market 0.756 0.561 0.914 -11.111 8.333
Transaction value 5,329 567 3,0124 125 1,066,646
Returns (arith.) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0295 -0.1993 0.2407
ln(Returns) -0.0006 0.0000 0.0294 -0.2223 0.2157
ln(Turnover) -8.16 -7.17 3.61 -22.73 -2.46
Delay 0.23 0.00 0.44 0.00 2.00
Total
mCap 14,359 2,628 60,219 13 711,802
VOL 469.68 57.90 1419.27 0.00 22382.40
Turnover 0.00218 0.00074 0.00640 0.00000 0.58450
Book-Market 0.751 0.559 0.908 -11.111 8.333
Transaction value 5,320 569 29,791 125 1,066,646
Returns (arith.) -0.0001 0.0000 0.0302 -0.3089 0.4814
ln(Returns) -0.0006 0.0000 0.0301 -0.3694 0.3930
ln(Turnover) -8.26 -7.20 3.70 -22.73 -2.46
Delay 0.24 0.00 0.45 0.00 2.00
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics, transaction type
The table illustrates the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of variables
market capitalisation (in mNOK), daily traded volume (in thousands), daily volume turnover, book-
market-ratio, transaction value (in tNOK) and notification delay (amount of days from transaction to
notification on NewsWeb), for purchase and sales transactions on the full sample, MERK and XOSL.
Mean Median SD Min Max
Purchase (N = 1104)
mCap 11,776 2,747 46,993 44 534,686
VOL 929.95 151.85 2424.60 0.00 22382.40
Turnover 0.00448 0.00169 0.01107 0.00000 0.17126
Book-Market 0.799 0.617 0.581 -0.455 4.000
Transaction value 4,437 520 25,153 125 675,000
Delay 0.23 0.00 0.45 0.00 2.00
Sale (N = 201)
mCap 30,802 2,707 117,788 65 711,802
VOL 957.70 230.40 2315.57 0.00 22382.40
Turnover 0.00603 0.00225 0.01330 0.00000 0.10096
Book-Market 0.498 0.375 0.519 -0.490 2.222
Transaction value 15,168 1,104 83,854 126 1,066,646
Delay 0.33 0.00 0.50 0.00 2.00
Table 14: Correlation matrix pre-matching
The table illustrates the correlation matrix of all variables pre-
matching (full event sample), in addition to the notification delay.
MERK ln(mCap) mCap Book-Market ln(Turnover) Turnover Abs. return [-10, -3] Delay
MERK 1
ln(mCap) -0.215⇤⇤⇤ 1
mCap -0.0418 0.515⇤⇤⇤ 1
Book-Market -0.0908⇤⇤ -0.0881⇤⇤ -0.0502 1
ln(Turnover) -0.190⇤⇤⇤ 0.0631⇤ 0.0103 0.0364 1
Turnover -0.0287 -0.0783⇤⇤ -0.0423 0.0671⇤ 0.441⇤⇤⇤ 1
Abs. return [-10, -3] 0.158⇤⇤⇤ -0.0362 -0.0136 -0.115⇤⇤⇤ -0.0783⇤⇤ -0.0237 1
Delay 0.147⇤⇤⇤ -0.114⇤⇤⇤ -0.0516 -0.0114 -0.236⇤⇤⇤ -0.0951⇤⇤ 0.0337 1
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 15: Correlation matrix post-matching
The table illustrates the correlation matrix of all variables post-matching, in addition to the notification
delay.
MERK ln(mCap) mCap Book-Market ln(Turnover) Turnover Abs. return [-10, -3] Delay
MERK 1
ln(mCap) -0.290⇤ 1
mCap -0.0967 0.716⇤⇤⇤ 1
Book-Market -0.0511 0.106 -0.106 1
ln(Turnover) 0.0311 -0.139 -0.109 0.0465 1
Turnover 0.0852 -0.239 -0.167 -0.164 0.569⇤⇤⇤ 1
Abs. return [-10, -3] 0.218 -0.0688 -0.0327 -0.170 0.189 0.251 1
Delay 0.381⇤⇤ -0.0811 0.0229 0.0697 -0.0833 -0.0421 0.0387 1
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
B Event study with log returns
Table 16: Event study CAAR with log returns
The table reports CAARs for insider purchase and sale transactions around the
event date. The sample includes all reported insider trades from 01.01.2017 to
28.02.2020 above NOK 125,000, including both MERK and XOSL. CAARs are
measured in logarithmic returns, where the market model has been utilised to calculate
  with estimation window [-110, -20]. Insider trades that have the same event
time have been aggregated into equally weighted portfolios to eliminate covariance.
CAAR
[0, 0] [0, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 2] [-1, 3] [-2, 0] [-2, 1] [-2, 2]
Purchases 1.10%⇤⇤⇤ 1.58%⇤⇤⇤ 1.61%⇤⇤⇤ 1.79%⇤⇤⇤ 1.98%⇤⇤⇤ 0.90%⇤⇤⇤ 1.38%⇤⇤⇤ 1.56%⇤⇤⇤
N=554 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Sales 0.02% 0.33% -0.67%⇤⇤⇤ -0.68%⇤⇤⇤ -0.47%⇤⇤ -0.86%⇤⇤⇤ -0.55%⇤⇤ -0.56%⇤⇤
N=171 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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C Cross-sectional regression models
C.1 T-tests of CAR and CAV industry difference
Table 17: Two-sample t-test with equal
variances, CAR and CAV by industry
The table presents a two sample t-test comparing the mean of CAR (cumulative abnormal
returns) and CAV (cumulative abnormal turnover) in event window [-2, 2] per industry to the
mean of all other industries combined for the same event window. The test is performed
on the pre-matching full sample of purchase transactions, including insider trades from both
MERK and XOSL. The test assumes the two samples to be normally distributed and have
the same variance. H0 is that there is no difference in the mean of the two samples.
Group Obs. Mean Std. err. Std. dev 95% Conf. Interval t Pr(|T| > |t|) Reject H0
Panel A: CAAR[-2, 2]
Finance 0 728 .0156634 .0031628 .0853383 .009454 .0218728
1 376 .0088604 .0025943 .050306 .0037591 .0139616 1.4232 0.1550 No
Energy 0 905 .0111411 .0024092 .0724779 .0064127 .0158694
1 199 .0233758 .0061324 .0865088 .0112825 .0354691 -2.0782 0.0379 Yes
Industrials 0 887 .0148352 .0025705 .0765562 .0097902 .0198802
1 217 .0072608 .0047381 .0697959 -.0020779 .0165996 1.3286 0.1843 No
Consumer goods 0 1,001 .0156116 .0023762 .0751789 .0109488 .0202745
1 103 -.0086678 .0072224 .0732996 -.0229935 .0056578 3.1282 0.0018 Yes
Healthcare 0 1,057 .0121828 .0022255 .0723535 .007816 .0165497
1 47 .0395149 .0179054 .1227532 .0034732 .0755566 -2.4402 0.0148 Yes
Technology 0 942 .0111712 .0023361 .0716992 .0065867 .0157558
1 162 .0259948 .0072926 .0928201 .0115933 .0403964 -2.3189 0.0206 Yes
Panel B: CAAV[-2, 2]
Finance 0 728 5.249788 .3214747 8.673861 4.618658 5.880917
1 376 4.183727 .3570759 6.923958 3.481605 4.885849 2.0671 0.0390 Yes
Energy 0 905 5.050703 .2757569 8.295656 4.509504 5.591901
1 199 4.140909 .5189125 7.320161 3.117605 5.164214 1.4295 0.1532 No
Industrials 0 887 4.685172 .2704774 8.055506 4.15432 5.216023
1 217 5.710506 .5709465 8.410567 4.585166 6.835846 -1.6660 0.0960 Yes
Consumer goods 0 1,001 5.111089 .2555748 8.086025 4.609565 5.612614
1 103 2.706083 .8181403 8.303218 1.083305 4.32886 2.8671 0.0042 Yes
Healthcare 0 1,057 4.66931 .2450974 7.968493 4.188377 5.150244
1 47 9.775869 1.479128 10.14039 6.798539 12.7532 -4.2443 0.0000 Yes
Technology 0 942 4.643837 .2549806 7.825869 4.143441 5.144234
1 162 6.298965 .7570115 9.635184 4.804013 7.793918 -2.3978 0.0167 Yes
64 C.2 Full sample regression models: CAR
C.2 Full sample regression models: CAR
Table 18: Full-sample CAR, different event
windows
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAR from insider purchases with
different event windows as the dependent variable. CAR is calculated using   from the
market model with estimation window [-110, -20]. Purchases with values below NOK 125,000
are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for companies listed on Merkur
Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalization in millions. Book-
Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Ln(Turnover) is the logarithmic turnover (volume/mCap).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[-1, 2] [-2, 1] [0, 0] [-2, 2]
MERK 0.0617⇤ 0.0580⇤ 0.0558⇤⇤ 0.0473⇤ 0.0268 0.0234 0.0588⇤ 0.0510⇤
(0.0341) (0.0346) (0.0274) (0.0280) (0.0190) (0.0203) (0.0301) (0.0287)
ln(mCap) -0.00627⇤⇤⇤ -0.00653⇤⇤⇤ -0.00531⇤⇤⇤ -0.00683⇤⇤⇤
(0.00188) (0.00179) (0.00108) (0.00194)
Book-Market -0.00508 -0.00745 -0.00669⇤⇤ -0.00592
(0.00699) (0.00660) (0.00326) (0.00720)
ln(Turnover) 0.00304⇤ 0.00136 0.00270⇤⇤ 0.00171
(0.00172) (0.00158) (0.00121) (0.00150)
Constant 0.0122⇤ 0.0866⇤⇤⇤ 0.0122⇤⇤ 0.0791⇤⇤⇤ 0.00629⇤ 0.0718⇤⇤⇤ 0.0117⇤ 0.0822⇤⇤⇤
(0.00635) (0.0207) (0.00597) (0.0195) (0.00364) (0.0124) (0.00605) (0.0209)
adj. R2 0.042 0.060 0.033 0.048 0.026 0.059 0.038 0.053
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 19: Full-sample CAR, different model
specifications
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAR from insider purchases with
event window [-2, 2] as the dependent variable. CAR is calculated using   from the
market model with estimation window [-110, -20]. Purchases with values below NOK 125,000
are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for companies listed on Merkur
Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalization in millions. Book-
Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Ln(Turnover) is the logarithmic turnover (volume/mCap).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
[-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2]
MERK 0.0627⇤⇤ 0.0582⇤ 0.0631⇤⇤ 0.0588⇤ 0.0525⇤ 0.0503⇤ 0.0529⇤ 0.0510⇤
(0.0315) (0.0299) (0.0315) (0.0301) (0.0283) (0.0286) (0.0282) (0.0287)
ln(mCap) -0.00752⇤⇤⇤ -0.00681⇤⇤⇤ -0.00759⇤⇤⇤ -0.00683⇤⇤⇤
(0.00184) (0.00194) (0.00181) (0.00194)
Book-Market -0.00338 -0.00624 -0.00316 -0.00592
(0.00630) (0.00697) (0.00652) (0.00720)
ln(Turnover) 0.00197 0.00149 0.00221 0.00171
(0.00164) (0.00149) (0.00165) (0.00150)
Constant 0.0111⇤⇤⇤ 0.00747⇤⇤ 0.0144⇤⇤⇤ 0.0117⇤ 0.0866⇤⇤⇤ 0.0774⇤⇤⇤ 0.0917⇤⇤⇤ 0.0822⇤⇤⇤
(0.00281) (0.00325) (0.00510) (0.00605) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0209)
adj. R2 0.023 0.038 0.023 0.038 0.046 0.053 0.046 0.053
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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C.3 Full sample regression models: CAV
Table 20: Full-sample CAV, different event
windows
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAV from insider purchases with different
event windows as the dependent variable. CAV is measured using log abnormal turnover, where
estimated normal turnover is calculated using the mean adjusted model with estimation window
[-40, -11]. The coefficients from the table give the abnormal turnover in reference to the mean.
Purchases with values below NOK 125,000 are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
companies listed on Merkur Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalisation
in millions. Book-Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Abs. return [-10, -3] is the difference
between average absolute return and average absolute OSEAX return from t =  10 and t =  3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[-1, 2] [-2, 1] [0, 0] [-2, 2]
MERK 3.931 2.535 3.989⇤ 3.171 1.329⇤ 0.917 4.883⇤ 3.681
(2.483) (2.129) (2.172) (2.030) (0.693) (0.631) (2.663) (2.431)
ln(mCap) -0.632⇤⇤⇤ -0.570⇤⇤⇤ -0.218⇤⇤⇤ -0.704⇤⇤⇤
(0.217) (0.221) (0.0694) (0.261)
Book-Market 0.0266 0.0864 0.118 -0.0330
(0.658) (0.572) (0.183) (0.736)
Abs. return [-10, -3] 6.273 -0.349 1.547 1.801
(5.308) (3.950) (1.640) (5.417)
Constant 3.502⇤⇤⇤ 8.562⇤⇤⇤ 2.948⇤⇤⇤ 7.440⇤⇤⇤ 1.360⇤⇤⇤ 3.025⇤⇤⇤ 3.620⇤⇤⇤ 9.282⇤⇤⇤
(0.672) (2.183) (0.587) (2.076) (0.215) (0.722) (0.782) (2.537)
adj. R2 0.074 0.095 0.079 0.093 0.082 0.113 0.081 0.094
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 21: Full-sample CAV, different model
specifications
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAV from insider purchases with event
window [-2, 2] as the dependent variable. CAV is measured using log abnormal turnover, where
estimated normal turnover is calculated using the mean adjusted model with estimation window
[-40, -11]. The coefficients from the table give the abnormal turnover in reference to the mean.
Purchases with values below NOK 125,000 are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
companies listed on Merkur Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalisation
in millions. Book-Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Abs. return [-10, -3] is the difference
between average absolute return and average absolute OSEAX return from t =  10 and t =  3.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
[-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2] [-2, 2]
MERK 5.807⇤⇤ 5.473⇤⇤ 5.212⇤ 4.883⇤ 4.131⇤ 4.477⇤ 3.299 3.681
(2.867) (2.548) (2.956) (2.663) (2.503) (2.342) (2.519) (2.431)
ln(mCap) -0.880⇤⇤⇤ -0.653⇤⇤ -0.907⇤⇤⇤ -0.704⇤⇤⇤
(0.264) (0.262) (0.272) (0.261)
Book-Market 0.260 0.631 -0.323 -0.0330
(0.678) (0.785) (0.615) (0.736)
Abs. return [-10, -3] 2.608 1.873 2.676 1.801
(6.309) (5.637) (6.115) (5.417)
Constant 4.676⇤⇤⇤ 4.053⇤⇤⇤ 4.034⇤⇤⇤ 3.620⇤⇤⇤ 11.51⇤⇤⇤ 8.786⇤⇤⇤ 11.56⇤⇤⇤ 9.282⇤⇤⇤
(0.569) (0.631) (0.746) (0.782) (2.463) (2.454) (2.628) (2.537)
adj. R2 0.017 0.043 0.056 0.081 0.043 0.057 0.083 0.094
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104 1104
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Post-match estimation for CAR,
different event windows
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAR from insider purchases across
different event windows as the dependent variable. The sample consists of a propensity-
score matched sample of MERK and XOSL. The CAR is calculated using   from the
market model with estimation window [-110, -20]. Purchases with values below NOK 125,000
are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for companies listed on Merkur
Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalization in millions. Book-
Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Ln(Turnover) is the logarithmic turnover (volume/mCap).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[-1, 2] [-2, 1] [0, 0] [-2, 2]
MERK 0.0698 0.0593 0.0682⇤⇤ 0.0605⇤ 0.0323 0.0278 0.0663⇤⇤ 0.0560⇤
(0.0451) (0.0458) (0.0313) (0.0335) (0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0325) (0.0329)
ln(mCap) -0.0101 -0.00748 -0.00350 -0.0117
(0.00932) (0.00598) (0.00621) (0.00720)
Book-Market -0.0196 0.0187 0.00261 0.0112
(0.0506) (0.0376) (0.0221) (0.0491)
ln(Turnover) 0.00787 0.00559 0.00548 0.00259
(0.00956) (0.00677) (0.00645) (0.00537)
Constant -0.00809 0.133 -0.0215 0.0412 0.00499 0.0587 -0.0317 0.0513
(0.0358) (0.109) (0.0365) (0.0864) (0.0293) (0.0880) (0.0358) (0.0747)
adj. R2 0.112 0.085 0.154 0.117 0.070 0.030 0.146 0.109
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
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Table 23: Post-match estimation for CAV,
different event windows
The model is a cross-sectional regression with logarithmic CAV from insider purchases with different
event windows as the dependent variable. The sample consists of a propensity-score matched
sample of MERK and XOSL. CAV is measured using log abnormal turnover, where estimated
normal turnover is calculated using the mean adjusted model with estimation window [-40, -11].
The coefficients from the table give the abnormal turnover in reference to the mean. Purchases
with values below NOK 125,000 are excluded. MERK is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
companies listed on Merkur Market. ln(mCap) is the logarithmic value of market capitalisation
in millions. Book-Market is the Book-to-Market ratio. Abs. return [-10, -3] is the difference
between average absolute return and average absolute OSEAX return from t =  10 and t =  3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[-1, 2] [-2, 1] [0, 0] [-2, 2]
MERK 4.445 2.387 4.328 3.474⇤ 1.181 0.790 5.106 3.756⇤
(3.203) (1.615) (2.864) (1.965) (1.110) (0.767) (3.532) (2.237)
ln(mCap) -0.552 -0.755 0.0752 -0.749
(0.892) (0.900) (0.374) (1.071)
Book-Market -2.204 -4.427 -0.204 -4.596
(2.790) (2.686) (1.271) (3.173)
Abs. return [-10, -3] 13.64 2.039 3.832 6.289
(8.704) (7.920) (3.164) (10.08)
Constant 4.305⇤ 11.56⇤ 0.184 10.89⇤ 2.352⇤⇤⇤ 2.286 1.674 12.78⇤
(2.532) (6.159) (3.147) (5.906) (0.697) (2.789) (3.426) (7.282)
adj. R2 0.065 0.137 0.096 0.082 -0.019 0.000 0.087 0.079
SE clustered by firm, week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
